Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 da73cc9abdb25463…

MALICIOUS

PDF

82.2 KB Created: 2021-06-18 21:19:59 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-02
MD5: babf27eabf32fe460e786d6422750e47 SHA-1: 2d5209ff9ac6e79e2fef925d773c5f0a806aec58 SHA-256: da73cc9abdb2546320cec6bcbfbe495b9c6e551ff5cd97b0526476974b7c2a2a
256 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript T1204.002 Malicious Link

This PDF document exhibits multiple indicators of malicious activity, including a high ML classifier score and ClamAV detection as a phishing trojan. It contains a link farm pointing to compromised CMS uploads and disposable hosting, suggesting an attempt to redirect users to malicious sites. The presence of a 'Payment redirection / bank-detail change lure' heuristic strongly indicates a business email compromise or financial fraud attempt.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE
    Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
  • Payment redirection / bank-detail change lure high SE_PAYMENT_REDIRECT_LURE
    Document describes new or changed bank, wire, ACH, IBAN, SWIFT, or routing instructions — a high-value business-email-compromise pattern
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Callback phishing phone lure medium SE_CALLBACK_LURE
    Document asks the user to call a phone number in billing, refund, subscription, fraud, or security context — consistent with callback phishing or tech-support scam patterns. Suppressed for legitimate-issuer (IRS/gov/official-form) documents that carry no urgency or charge/dispute escalation.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://dragonera.cn/admin/userfiles/file/bobuke.pdf In PDF document text
    • https://www.dolphinrfid.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160b8b331d11be---58823223781.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://nek.ua/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160847cb88658d---nunuwavurebezivesiveduwuw.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mediabandit.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607309a8d9a35---79628021249.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://europeancustomtailor.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/e71f6e322896d844b47d0c1d8b476a39/zinuputokozetupidigunefa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://funkydrop.shop/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/5f881c05f8d7b552d3b913c7a5666886/40994820109.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cristiandellavedova.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/s9ik7er24djjnh42gc3j0phf94/dazen.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://tunglamgarden.com/images/fck/file/wijorojoderuzoramasa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://playbabydoll.com/userfiles/file/21383093414.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.ciabrini-immobilier.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/t2ln6f6pk50fk991nju33sp5g6/novemuduzirotanebude.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://cedresarquitectura.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160be2c061d236---sugofogamev.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://xn--80ackbssfuieecff0e8c.xn--p1ai/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/3ke70517v5f36e7tqrrkq1kcb2/55015026196.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://aven.su/userfiles/file/50987719211.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ljhalls.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/dacba8dbf6244756e91b1ff21ee7966a/14754858855.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sgpropertylawyers.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/6b89ad8aaacc84cca7a02b5003634036/66949443026.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.colegiodesafio.net/home/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160985572a519f---67007491766.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://globalazeri.az/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/03sqkg1mnats593apdv7gr0fb3/91855812647.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://outsourcedbackoffice.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/ce94090210dc4d6e70dc1fa38a890b48/59041620861.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://drahmetbostanci.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a341cfbed3d---sekirus.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/Uplcv/~3/A3Ryygt5BCM/uplcv?utm_term=miwam+verify+your+identity+linkPDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0001004c.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1004C 5200 bytes
SHA-256: 91fb69dbb4a29cfcc258d8b9d81caa275ecbf4fec1f80a0acd74e4e8f6f1d743
font_01_sfnt_off0001120f.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1120F 11840 bytes
SHA-256: 5bff4e81359e50e67cfe6a6323e932588b84b951b3c4bcfbf74bae947d084f1b

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