Office (OLE) / .XLS malware analysis — malicious · da6830bb1b0fce1a

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

1.73 MB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel

MD5: 4d532e4cbaed09bf7a94034f947065fc SHA-1: b37f9099585d2430a5073c249b07d56867036c6e SHA-256: da6830bb1b0fce1aa78ee55488d4d91e471410609fde26b7f0f0214eccdeaafe

130 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.001 PowerShell

The critical heuristic firing for CVE-2017-0199 indicates that the OLE object is attempting to load a remote resource via a URL moniker. This is further supported by the embedded URL found in the document text. The presence of a secondary embedded PDF with suspicious static findings suggests a multi-stage attack. The sample's primary function appears to be acting as a loader for a secondary payload.

Heuristics 5

OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199

Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE

A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS

Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL

The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main
- http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
- http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
- http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/

Extracted artifacts 6

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`macros.bas` `7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673`	vba-macro	oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source)	1206 bytes
`stream_014_off0003f52b.bin` `b0a7e7055d5b66edffe76c7b1f32ec80318d696df6181f1536f27aa69517872f`	decompressed-pdf-stream	PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x3F52B	566620 bytes
`stream_015_off0006f1fe.bin` `0d5715bfb4def94d644e408c5ed714ea2ac557b061d036e7fdcf0a2bf1c990e2`	decompressed-pdf-stream	PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x6F1FE	398152 bytes
`font_02_sfnt_off000882ce.bin` `ff37b045be3591e8cfbfa76f5dec51bee78deccafa1dc391d1edb36502c7f815`	pdf-font-stream	PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x882CE	346068 bytes
`polyglot_child_pdf_off000b2a00.pdf` `38c34bcd062bec249101cc7a04fc8ed0a8a0f49aed46e7e73bc9a3741519ed75`	polyglot-child-pdf	Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0xB2A00	1085440 bytes
`polyglot_child_pdf_off00000e00.pdf` `d814ba1511ad2d69a5231edbfc565227ca8a0aad247bc68b6259de49335838d3`	polyglot-child-pdf	Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0xE00	1813504 bytes

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