Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 da4f77623b83b651…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

76.4 KB Created: 2021-03-11 19:45:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000
MD5: 2c96449d75db1c96eefee743b36c6645 SHA-1: 8bb4ce78636ee35d0ac1d3611e4e5e0d5e46724c SHA-256: da4f77623b83b651db1f0eaedae8ea0f773e310535dea7d719e1e9c114620be0
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.002 Malicious File

The OOXML document contains a VBA macro with an AutoOpen function, which is designed to execute automatically when the document is opened. The macro utilizes the Shell() function, indicating it's intended to run external commands. This strongly suggests the macro's purpose is to download and execute a secondary payload. No specific family could be identified, but the technique is common for initial access.

Heuristics 6

  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains vbaProject.bin — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
e2badc9106f7bfc06af8f118190ca07f63a34b6b4759d5977d7f377956c9bb79		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 5611 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 shell/COM execution token(s). Carved artifact contains 1 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 7 long base64-like blob(s). Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.
vbaProject_00.bin
6019012e8ff408b383fdcec19412009307cdd60ab6a28a6ec8b8b9d9d4617537		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 28672 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 shell/COM execution token(s). Carved artifact contains 1 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 7 long base64-like blob(s). Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.

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