Malicious Office (OLE) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 da47b14dae0eae9d…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .DOC

131.0 KB Created: 2007-09-18 04:34:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Word 11.
MD5: 6963895f82c456923a5e55816154c44d SHA-1: 05df7219f900c1657486337837fbe5bf11fb81eb SHA-256: da47b14dae0eae9df7a36b61df7192f82a3753427e5b9556b38378501c2ec89b
82 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell

The file is an OLE document with a significant amount of slack space, indicating an appended payload. Heuristics suggest this appended content is executable. While VBA macros could not be extracted due to an unsupported format, the presence of appended executable data strongly suggests a malicious intent to deliver a secondary payload. The SHA256 hash is included as a primary indicator.

Heuristics 3

  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    OLE file is 134,144 bytes but its declared streams total only 16,486 bytes — 117,658 bytes (88%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
  • OLE file has appended executable-looking payload bytes high OLE_APPENDED_PAYLOAD
    OLE compound file contains a large high-entropy region beyond the declared major streams and that region includes shellcode, PE, or loader API markers. This is a payload-carrier signal, not a specific CVE attribution by itself.
  • Unsupported Office format for VBA extraction info OFFICE_FORMAT_UNSUPPORTED
    olevba could not extract VBA macros (PermissionError); format-agnostic byte-level scans still ran. Likely legacy, encrypted, or malformed OLE/OOXML — re-scanning the same bytes will yield the same outcome.