Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 da159bdd44a0b953…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

3.4 KB
MD5: 4a59a417a3d50a5f89a02293776f097f SHA-1: b948b3fae649d71c82827771c0309f8bef4689dd SHA-256: da159bdd44a0b953d2cee996b2dac65254c2b03676549420fb2339ca0f5234d8
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object with a split Equation Editor ProgID, indicating an attempt to exploit the Equation Editor vulnerability. The \objupdate directive further suggests that the OLE object is designed to be activated automatically upon opening, leading to code execution. This is a common delivery mechanism for exploiting known vulnerabilities in older Microsoft Office versions.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000006b.bin
63d42b90a7256974a1f875c3544b44e424f52b4d34ad07c091bd6e6fda16e13f
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x6B 1593 bytes