Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 da1572b871bcc28e…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

3.7 KB
MD5: 6e5d15ee86e1dc5023d892c31d4d2019 SHA-1: 683215f59b8da266e2fec5b4e749420529aea766 SHA-256: da1572b871bcc28eb8469433a7cde5e1a231bf262ea4be9e282201ecf400481a
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.001 PowerShell

The RTF file contains embedded OLE object data and specifically targets the Equation Editor, indicating an exploitation attempt. The ".objupdate" field suggests that the embedded object is automatically activated upon opening the document. This is a common technique for delivering exploits, likely leading to arbitrary code execution.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000043.bin
9d2f0a1f65a7b536cce3bf86f4f924bdbd7d35038d2e31926d3bf19398f999a1
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x43 1803 bytes