Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 da0f0e6b4cd083bb…

MALICIOUS

PDF

42.9 KB Created: 2020-11-07 18:52:21 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-09-14
MD5: 7693acf590d2cb2b03a6e222d092ce52 SHA-1: 29d50fdbc64ebe11342b5431dbece9dde17637de SHA-256: da0f0e6b4cd083bbf51c3c645b835d97e719c14389964ce21b17cb279b5e0af1
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF document contains numerous links, including one pointing to a known malicious redirector, and is structured as a link farm. The document body text explicitly mentions 'Download movie apk for windows 10', indicating a lure to trick users into clicking these links. The ML classifier strongly supports the malicious nature of this PDF.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ggtraff.ru/123?keyword=download+movie+apk+for+windows+10 In PDF document text
    • https://wuwenivavubujer.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437756/ragiroxirug_pofetazek_jasovisaxi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fijojonibiw.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132681787/kizerapu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://tulejimukun.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134399478/3184134.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fodezamu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131407453/wijigomofiweb_lotitosede_jukis_dirum.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nasinapalu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739684/e8c83d4e8324.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mogilifus.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739831/sixukejomiwewanage.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zafigitelerom.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134338481/8a2224e37361c.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wadamosemexijep.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134434227/12214839ecfe1b.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nikokabiliru.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131409463/devamet-derekaw.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://subefivu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134688636/5910345.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zoxuzuxebexot.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/9/130969059/9051060.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://gorujugiximu.files.wordpress.com/2020/11/karipevo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://namuxalapo.files.wordpress.com/2020/11/tikojosegegivazon.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mutabivini.files.wordpress.com/2020/11/dungeons_and_dragons_3.5_monster_manual.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off000067ca.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x67CA 5596 bytes
SHA-256: 79918ef4cc76ed54ab3cb264803a9a0ee32d5cc86042103cad02a9eebebd1106
font_01_sfnt_off00007ae3.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7AE3 10616 bytes
SHA-256: 866def6124544427d76d998e25269c13aab81cb0cdbdbe1fe5213b5cf0004345

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.