Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d9fb78c6f6467877…

MALICIOUS

PDF

78.4 KB Created: 2021-03-11 00:49:42 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: ddb3d7c848b3d8e7d432bee8a60e66d1 SHA-1: 744526c8ce909c7984300ddd61944f9ef1f2df28 SHA-256: d9fb78c6f6467877d068aec9a1ffbb47320d8c8f3f93f80f2a78bffbb09b0aa6
96 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF file was detected as malicious by ClamAV and an ML classifier, indicating a high likelihood of malicious intent. It contains an embedded URL pointing to 'vilenefex.ru', which is likely used to deliver a secondary payload or conduct phishing. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, suggests a lure related to 'rounding to significant figures worksheet with answers pdf', aiming to trick users into clicking the malicious link.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9997

Heuristics 4

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://vilenefex.ru/strik?utm_term=rounding+to+significant+figures+worksheet+with+answers+pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4368504/normal_60111fd8ca982.pdf
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/risubibasero/ehjPgfM/bolusu.pdf
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4491433/normal_5fdd77836b6a3.pdf
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/midijanere/dSpjige/tetasanijikatuku.pdf
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4389794/normal_5fd09136b3f2c.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4486748/normal_602d961e642d7.pdf
    • http://rorujav.22web.org/dvt_prophylaxis_guidelines_2016_nice.pdf
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/jobolekul/gchfJij/71235583339.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4392857/normal_5fd7c14ddc7a6.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • http://www.opentle.org
    • http://bideliv.rf.gd/bernard_mandeville_fable_of_the_bees.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/regufojalojaza/8366838122.pdf
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/8b876a09-3e9d-4f86-be18-970c02078191/java_interview_questions_for_testers.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/jazofi/12911128394.pdf
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/3ea211af-333b-4b59-bca5-10ecb84a7c1a/49068725062.pdf
    • http://kexeban.rf.gd/nojunosopowoxaxozeku.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/vavapekadoliti/digamu.pdf
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/6731ed4e-ff80-4462-a876-1d1ecd442cf9/how_do_i_reset_the_code_on_my_lg_washing_machine.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/wexoteluwag/57724785080.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/wujanozo/mechanism_of_blastic_transformation.pdf
    • http://risawobukaduzu.rf.gd/xeduzurapiwuvube.pdf
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/cfaa23ae-f393-4d7c-9f7b-e5873d543001/samsung_tv_hdmi_arc_stb.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL
    • http://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e4ff.bin
1e01df0f516ddb7be6abb3996197e770a0b24c690b28ad9a72bf60713b541e5c		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE4FF 5548 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000f7f2.bin
7a02da73c5ff24218d04b188db7d31ceb9303d5dedd43b645f18a615a19d9b6a		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF7F2 6068 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off000107a3.bin
099c3bc7c2ae65c64828aa88ae9667955f472cc5031c0dd3877a2fe3f382f723		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x107A3 10440 bytes

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