Malicious Office (OLE) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d9ddc51a3c55f47f…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .DOC

163.0 KB
MD5: a2030a0343682682dd71537cb6eb0b73 SHA-1: c3720afc844b01047c329271e30e4ab7b332b85a SHA-256: d9ddc51a3c55f47f732b7d0b5c38aea9a8997d3380dfc3e3b7f5193a73f355de
220 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.002 Malicious File T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information

The file is a malicious OLE document exhibiting significant slack space, a common indicator of packed or obfuscated content. Heuristics indicate the use of WinExec, LoadLibrary, and GetProcAddress, along with XOR-encoded strings, suggesting dynamic code execution and obfuscation techniques. The presence of embedded objects like Excel and PowerPoint further supports its role as a container for malicious content.

Heuristics 5

  • XOR-encoded strings (key 0x03) critical SC_XOR_ENCODED
    Found 8 Windows library/API name(s) XOR-encoded with single-byte key 0x03: 'VirtualAlloc', 'VirtualAlloc', 'VirtualAllocEx', 'VirtualProtect', 'VirtualProtectEx', 'CreateProcessA', 'WriteProcessMemory', 'ReadProcessMemory'
  • Reference to WinExec API high SC_STR_WINEXEC
    Reference to WinExec API
  • Reference to LoadLibrary API high SC_STR_LOADLIBRARY
    Reference to LoadLibrary API
  • Reference to GetProcAddress API high SC_STR_GETPROCADDRESS
    Reference to GetProcAddress API
  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    OLE file is 166,912 bytes but its declared streams total only 31,351 bytes — 135,561 bytes (81%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).