Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d9861c56bbf61abf…

MALICIOUS

PDF

72.5 KB Created: 2021-02-10 19:22:32 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-09-16
MD5: 08c1e32f3989b16b854f6461acffdbef SHA-1: 2d66fbc9e63f1e111ae9989b8f09557eff4b9604 SHA-256: d9861c56bbf61abfdf0dd9b2b0306989a01fd94100ba6411dd8aa0d784eeadf6
194 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF file exhibits characteristics of a phishing lure, specifically using an 'Xero accounting software tutorial' theme to entice users. It contains a significant number of external links, many hosted on disposable domains, suggesting a link farm designed to redirect users to malicious content. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent, likely related to phishing or malware distribution.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Fake invoice / payment lure low SE_INVOICE_LURE
    Document contains invoice or payment language paired with an action verb — useful context when combined with link, macro, or attachment indicators
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://crophysi.ru/aws?utm_term=xero+accounting+software+tutorial+pdf PDF link annotation
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/moxulofilose/idjeijv/41165840872.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zasuzepomuban.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134627511/danexaper_kisijuxejogajel.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://feroxetisilujux.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131409167/4a88d269b03af.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nedetuvozuwe.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134699612/xufajaroraki.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://tukobigerokigab.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134653943/gupeli-pumadif-fufesir.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gifaxopolipo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739444/givibovubabakok_komilif_zeware_rimuk.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/xerejijasoma/ggghT7U/zombie_warrior_unblocked.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/jarebomu/ogdsx5e/field_goal_kicker_salary.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/vulovosovem/jZh5ijD/fifodiviruz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://artelamp.store/247514634851h06l.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://pokavitapizinuv.iblogger.org/udemy_videos_on_pc.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://totufozumad.iblogger.org/mindathedi_kuyile_song_free.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://wubexemetaxoru.epizy.com/ronowebi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/zarelusipofox/entrepreneurship_curriculum_guide_senior_high_school.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/jusuberu/bigevudurasezad.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/mamibis/font_awesome_cheatsheet_5.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000dd33.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xDD33 5392 bytes
SHA-256: fc2b94085f473a869106caf1a5069d69656d34dc450c2c4b1b69f1bc749aef1d
font_01_sfnt_off0000efac.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xEFAC 10392 bytes
SHA-256: 9d51799ace574bd99b17512cfceb5d534a92d007557cf45872dd7754b177938d

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