Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d9847123b526161e…

MALICIOUS

RTF

81.7 KB First seen: 2024-09-06
MD5: afb14dcb82dbb041183e8d492c415a13 SHA-1: 6e75ff4e6d06c9824d9a9b50061d22c21f7d659f SHA-256: d9847123b526161e5454f0b6ba07218041ccc47e15171972c3d04d681a1bfba0
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File T1059.001 PowerShell T1059.003 Windows Command Shell

The sample is an RTF document that contains an embedded OLE object, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability (CVE-2017-11882). The ".objupdate" directive forces the activation of this embedded object, triggering the exploit. This technique is commonly used to download and execute a secondary malicious payload, leading to a full system compromise.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001dca.bin
6a1e365f8f79e98e08993fdd4bd2e9c02773109e7408a87967f97dc59e239ee3
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1DCA 1555 bytes