Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d98207a64018e8c8…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

6.9 KB
MD5: 95297ed280c6ef8e60198f5d588ac38c SHA-1: 66117a6a30c1951dbbe589501d0b34dbf335134e SHA-256: d98207a64018e8c8768251dc020aa06972f23564db65b5600d0f73ef8133affb
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF file contains multiple indicators of exploiting the Equation Editor vulnerability, including OLE object data and automatic linking, which are commonly used to deliver malicious payloads. The file type and heuristic firings strongly suggest an exploit targeting Equation Editor, likely delivered via a spearphishing attachment.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000985.bin
d8f6f96e1d6a86ed9c40bf6b0bf48e28180919c35e33c28ec0f7c106836e3d02
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x985 1760 bytes