Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d95f6a672a8cd7ef…

MALICIOUS

RTF

20.2 KB
MD5: 51ad416de75d50ca0f1217339ee8e7d8 SHA-1: a59593f6836b293734e1f25cae5fbe021186198f SHA-256: d95f6a672a8cd7ef0b155d0696e245403611190ff51dccc9f58a0c7f4c90df2e
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File Execution: User Execution

The sample is an RTF document that contains embedded OLE objects and triggers an update mechanism, strongly indicating exploitation of the Equation Editor vulnerability (CVE-2017-11882). The presence of `RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR` and `RTF_OBJUPDATE` heuristics confirms this. This exploit typically leads to the execution of arbitrary code, which is then used to download and run a secondary payload. The document body content is heavily obfuscated and does not provide clear user-facing lures.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00002004.bin
f72efbb348a33b964d86919676a29cf0feddab97e3865200e6dfc2dc2308f60b
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x2004 1630 bytes