Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d8f43b35cd944e3a…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

394.0 KB Created: 2019-09-17 13:59:00
MD5: b7f5cd0f71b6d7d065a71b15da48e3c4 SHA-1: 86d4ca02380ee9e7f92eeb88c620f033ece6ad7a SHA-256: d8f43b35cd944e3a4852ae3241afccae491317a11853385b86e6859fc07abc29
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.001 User Execution: Malicious Link T1059.001 PowerShell

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object that triggers the CVE-2017-8759 vulnerability. This vulnerability allows for arbitrary code execution when the OLE object is activated, likely through the ".objupdate" directive. The presence of RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR and RTF_OBJDATA heuristics further supports the exploitation of embedded objects. The document body is heavily obfuscated and does not provide clear user-facing content, but the technical indicators strongly suggest a malicious exploit delivery.

Heuristics 6

  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • Equation Editor CLSID critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0005ea09.bin
e863d66670d0370f4b19a27797e33fbd27b9c8662fd614ca47f3e8ccd9dac984		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x5EA09 3739 bytes

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