Jrat — Office (OLE) malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d8bef6e24e6faa20…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

1.36 MB Created: 2021-07-15 09:57:00
MD5: b55bb126dd3962a05bf15d27ba832223 SHA-1: 069aefe704193c0014ffc90af2e3ce76166eee1c SHA-256: d8bef6e24e6faa20f4cfaa6d3cadedefff93a37a2e6337fbb89b7be718b17d31
642 Risk Score

Malware Insights

Jrat · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter

The sample is a malicious Office document containing a VBA macro that executes upon opening. The macro references WinExec and ShellExecute APIs, and attempts to create a file named 'ier.dll' in the user's template path, likely to download and execute a second-stage payload. The ClamAV detection 'Doc.Downloader.Jrat-6336393-1' strongly suggests the Jrat family.

Heuristics 16

  • CVE-2007-3899 — Microsoft Word malformed string memory corruption critical CVE likely CVE_2007_3899
    Word OLE document has the MS07-060 malformed-string exploit shape: a Word 97-family FIB points to a malformed DOP/string-table region with an abnormal INT_MAX run, inflated text counters, and exploit payload or Mdropper.Z campaign evidence.
  • Office EPRINT stream contains EMF object high CVE related OLE_EPRINT_EMF_OBJECT
    OLE ObjectPool contains an EPRINT stream with EMF data. This is rare in normal documents and is CVE-2007-3893/MS07-046-family evidence when paired with Office exploit payload anomalies, but the malformed EMF record is not proven by this rule alone.
  • OLE with Ole10Native — possible CVE-2026-21514 exploitation high CVE likely CVE_2026_21514
    Document contains a Word OLE object with Ole10Native plus executable, PE, or risky remote-link indicators. CVE-2026-21514 exploits OLE metadata validation; this stronger structure is treated as likely exploitation.
  • Embedded PE executable critical OLE_EMBEDDED_EXE
    MZ/PE header found inside document — possible embedded executable
  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Jrat-6336393-1 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.Jrat-6336393-1
  • ClamAV detection on extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_CLAMAV
    ClamAV flagged at least one file extracted from inside this sample. Even when the wrapping document carries no AV detection of its own, a hit on the carved artifact is a strong indicator the sample is a delivery vehicle.
  • Reference to WinExec API high SC_STR_WINEXEC
    Reference to WinExec API
  • Reference to ShellExecute API high SC_STR_SHELLEXEC
    Reference to ShellExecute API
  • Reference to LoadLibrary API high SC_STR_LOADLIBRARY
    Reference to LoadLibrary API
  • Reference to GetProcAddress API high SC_STR_GETPROCADDRESS
    Reference to GetProcAddress API
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • Ole10Native package carries executable/script file type high OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE
    OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in an executable or script-capable extension. Even without UI extension spoofing, embedding a runnable payload inside an Office document is a high-risk delivery pattern.
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Reference to VirtualAlloc API medium SC_STR_VIRTUALALLOC
    Reference to VirtualAlloc API
  • VBA macros detected medium OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
e3369546294f4e81ce018004ba8d9ab604e8f490a4b044d291a9ba95eae7fd70		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 3258 bytes
embedded_office_0008fc6e.exe
0941f91731ee4a6a86c1f385683f318e3d4daf69f4efa700afe9c55087313396		 embedded-pe Office MZ+PE at offset 0x8FC6E 832914 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Packed.Zusy-9878765-0
Obfuscation or payload: unlikely
ole10native_00.bin
1408b10bf545d0bb0c8c9e35b0b74174d1ef68e2ef2e0ad4ab5f6beb554c2f2e		 ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: ObjectPool/_1687823069/Ole10Native 792364 bytes

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