Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d88b02ce86fb63ae…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

1.25 MB
MD5: f7350dd9963a2e0f47c8e8197d7bba74 SHA-1: 159062f8aa82894ddaecddb9b385c90beacf03e2 SHA-256: d88b02ce86fb63ae75305d8a90f50fd2ce8124274c880021da15c3d807a5e5e0
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains multiple OLE objects, including a critical finding related to Equation Editor (CVE-2017-11882). The presence of RTF_OBJDATA, RTF_OBJEMB, and RTF_OBJUPDATE heuristics strongly indicates the exploitation of this known vulnerability. The embedded OLE object is designed to activate and execute code, likely leading to a second-stage payload download or execution. The document body contains obfuscated JavaScript-like code, further supporting the malicious intent.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000de5.bin
e24a0e016e2a3e7fc62f669c45001f8dc6ef21f9b8ae617986962d8ea87bbaf8
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xDE5 35698 bytes
objdata_01_off0001b956.bin
9b91062a03e9fdd8a03263da4723b4d1ad80648827b3ecc6eac7f9d4433f9e2c
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1B956 333256 bytes