RTF malware analysis — malicious · d878f9df753cb71c

MALICIOUS

RTF

47.9 KB First seen: 2019-01-31

MD5: 8c258bd8f7f13f5cd8b5dea3264d6b42 SHA-1: c76311bb6308225fd100bc3c96d35b0d3ba42cb9 SHA-256: d878f9df753cb71cc7d335ae26eab1fcc24abbd997567b9690dd3c264e879440

160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains embedded OLE objects and specifically triggers the Equation Editor vulnerability. The presence of ".objupdate" indicates that the embedded OLE object is designed to be activated automatically upon opening, leading to the exploitation of the Equation Editor. This strongly suggests an attempt to execute arbitrary code on the victim's machine.

Heuristics 4

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical CVE likely RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK

RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off0000a469.bin`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0xA469	1596 bytes
SHA-256: `90878053d907fac45a96b4ca365953e644681fa653695ba21c20f753ab89a95d`

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