Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d8757c153f7aa029…

MALICIOUS

PDF

77.9 KB Created: 2021-02-15 15:28:12 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-23
MD5: 80908529d72179ab968dd6549708b1fa SHA-1: 2cf63f9f1fa2a1258925f4063da55e6e3b400ee9 SHA-256: d8757c153f7aa0293b0a81a690848052b1cd3d4e26d3ad5726520e78f423f34d
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF file contains a link farm with numerous external URLs, indicating an attempt to redirect users to potentially malicious websites. The presence of a ClamAV detection for 'Pdf.Phishing.Trojan' and ML classifier flagging further supports a malicious intent. While no scripts were directly extracted, the structure suggests it's designed to facilitate access to external content, likely for phishing or malware delivery.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://jottigo.ru/wb?keyword=pentair%20easy%20touch%20control%20panel PDF link annotation
    • http://gufutaca1.xyz/gemokasaxaxixrdd3.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://mavitrade.com/946760608131fif5.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4454303/normal_601cad045792c.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4490371/normal_600254915fa4d.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4498997/normal_601ca10042a3c.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://bilet-pdd.site/pakofawufisaxavegu250bl.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4412161/normal_6028356c44b52.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://allieshouseofhope.com/gaguritaloronizimcwzq3.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4495395/normal_601a0a7b00c94.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xujopikaxatanow.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134850499/memuvipepal_zatagu_werapogojifu_wexaxima.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/pixisuja/hajhdTO/methodologie_management_des_entreprises_bts_muc.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://itfamily.pro/75191639742p5jas.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zovakobazala.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131456363/4378286.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/suzixegazunow/bandook_song_video_jass_manak.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/supefujoxopubu/gasazuzorig.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000f12a.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF12A 5124 bytes
SHA-256: 4623b613b8c1dac11879e27e362e32b37a01e312a5f6dd52513976d28b1426b7
font_01_sfnt_off0001029d.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1029D 11980 bytes
SHA-256: 361280c1565f4b708cb34e13118d148d3e33e15f4bb06c9425428413f7af597f

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