Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d85c56a8b182ff6f…

MALICIOUS

RTF

434.2 KB Created: 2018-02-18 16:27:00 First seen: 2019-04-18
MD5: fb78d96aba78beb92d5a4560dfd7de52 SHA-1: 066d339a9d13447aaebdfeacae1ca0c515cf2b22 SHA-256: d85c56a8b182ff6fd31e6ade415c9f0a9d116cbbc462106d02ab3816318b2241
202 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document exploits CVE-2017-11882 (Equation Editor FONT record overflow) and CVE-2017-8759 (MSXML SAX OLE activation) to achieve code execution. The embedded OLE object and objupdate heuristic suggest the file attempts to activate these exploits. The embedded URL points to a potential second-stage payload, indicating a likely spearphishing attachment delivery method.

Heuristics 6

  • CVE-2017-11882 — Equation Editor FONT record overflow critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882
    Equation Editor MTEF contains an overlong FONT typeface field, the vulnerable copy primitive for CVE-2017-11882. This is stronger evidence than the Equation Editor CLSID alone because it identifies the malformed record that drives code execution in EQNEDT32.EXE.
  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://andinihijab.com/ja/build_outputff391ef.msi In RTF body
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordmlIn RTF body

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00009e3c.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x9E3C 15672 bytes
SHA-256: 96048af06be2d87a1dcf2885e6d5108b52dc7e0f5c6c34c17aec202399486caa

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