Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d7da23d7fa038a02…

MALICIOUS

PDF

507.8 KB Created: 2006-01-16 08:00:26 -10:00 Authoring application: Adobe InDesign CS2 (4.0.2) (via Adobe PDF Library 7.0)
MD5: d83d4b05a6d369bab89a07bd0ba24615 SHA-1: 04c31fe09b8b9489b3f4209f33258e5d3e3006e9 SHA-256: d7da23d7fa038a024623b7a16fc1f770e0396261cc2352f5f980d1b01856d6ca
514 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The PDF file contains a critical launch action that executes cmd.exe with parameters designed to run a dropped executable. This executable is disguised as 'productimages.pdf' but is identified as a Windows executable by ClamAV, which also flags it as Win.Spyware.Zbot-1275. The ML classifier and multiple critical heuristics strongly indicate malicious intent, specifically leveraging CVE-2010-1240 for command execution and payload delivery.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9981

Heuristics 12

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\productimages.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • ClamAV detection on extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_CLAMAV
    ClamAV flagged at least one file extracted from inside this sample. Even when the wrapping document carries no AV detection of its own, a hit on the carved artifact is a strong indicator the sample is a delivery vehicle.
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/exif/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/photoshop/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/tiff/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceRef#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ManifestItem#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
productimages.pdf
663f584c3cb6b89c16af04c3de4b5022da37dc2130431b1a0ecad2e021d341f9		 pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 107 at offset 0x68575 141824 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Spyware.Zbot-1275
Obfuscation or payload: unlikely
javascript_obj0108_000.js
6b9b1e3e7022c4a0902dddc234093d8efa91c3eff32d0e1c3daac4b1e351e91a		 pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 108 at offset 0x7E58B 62 bytes
icc_00_off00002cdd.icc
2b3aa1645779a9e634744faf9b01e9102b0c9b88fd6deced7934df86b949af7e		 pdf-icc-profile PDF ICC profile at offset 0x2CDD 3144 bytes

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