RTF malware analysis — malicious · d7d8d00e506ee58b

MALICIOUS

RTF

37.7 KB First seen: 2023-06-19

MD5: cf868ac3637e9010ff08dc9c7c3400b5 SHA-1: dffc4c57ceafce8174e3c12e136dee32079df33c SHA-256: d7d8d00e506ee58be147aa786d59b31fabe3529dd2fe8f427420a58781fd42cf

160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object and specifically targets the Equation Editor, indicating an exploit attempt. The presence of a lure instructing the user to 'Enable editing' further supports this, as it's a common tactic to bypass security measures and trigger the exploit. The embedded object is likely a payload delivery mechanism.

Heuristics 5

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB

RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE

Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00004ae7.bin` `787d5ca1d035596af25872b62beb988ebc3d1a91b35e45b626a9f19aff3b95da`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x4AE7	1582 bytes

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