Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d7d3b0d4579e41af…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

4.5 KB
MD5: d735d7dc4ac6e6a8f557d54593fb15aa SHA-1: 8a66f383c608817bac17262eb0a40780bf3840c8 SHA-256: d7d3b0d4579e41afae02cc40041eb538b17fc7b5c63cd25e2c1b95edf6254391
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1559.001 Component Object Model Hijacking

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects, specifically triggering heuristics related to the Equation Editor vulnerability. The presence of ".objdata" sections and the ".objupdate" directive strongly indicate an attempt to exploit a known vulnerability in the Equation Editor component to achieve arbitrary code execution upon opening the document.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000b0.bin
f5bbc9d2e7f7bfc06340d53cbd0659ac543a0e76858146d69ead23a92c6bfbe5
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xB0 2040 bytes