Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d7cd1e66d6fc3c2c…

MALICIOUS

PDF

26.8 KB Created: 2010-05-07 10:11:50 +08:00 Authoring application: Acrobat 编辑器 8.0 (via Adobe Acrobat 8.0) First seen: 2026-05-11
MD5: ae896e7fd4907ed4272cf5a24d917a96 SHA-1: 8282f71be0a6cc9c8e78b646b7efedc478ce1f0d SHA-256: d7cd1e66d6fc3c2c1cd9c4bffc1e33766cda3cdd2a0137cf5e1a80b23e95efe2
440 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF file exploits CVE-2010-1240 to launch cmd.exe, which is configured to execute an embedded Windows executable payload. This payload is disguised as a PDF file named 'C:\hello.pdf' but is detected as a Windows executable. The document itself appears to be an image-based lure, typical of phishing attacks.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9999

Heuristics 10

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • Image-only document with action trigger (screenshot lure) medium PDF_IMAGE_LURE
    PDF has 1 image(s), only 1 text block(s), carries a click-outward action, and is only 26 KB — typical shape of a phishing lure where a full-page screenshot hides a clickable button that launches or submits to an attacker URL.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns# In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
🗂 Part of campaign: shared payload 956af1225b 4 samples

Related samples 3

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
Chello.pdf pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 51 at offset 0x2925 73728 bytes
SHA-256: 956af1225b7801d20b442c2d15d9cbd7b497f01a99fd2829c0c610ab00719b94
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
actual_type=PE; declared_or_context_type=PDF; filename=Chello.pdf; kind=pdf-embedded-file
javascript_obj0052_000.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 52 at offset 0x65E9 57 bytes
SHA-256: 65a16cb7861335d5ace3c60718b5052e44660726da4cd13bb745381b235a1785

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