Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d7cb445cb93acd1a…

MALICIOUS

RTF

27.7 KB First seen: 2023-06-06
MD5: 6b1cb681b8aaef4da5d19b21d9c4033f SHA-1: 45de6b831c7e561f7828b621166606e18f5f8c3c SHA-256: d7cb445cb93acd1a875e2f82e7e28fa0ef541fdb87f79a20a87afddfb6aad2f8
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File Execution: User Execution: Malicious File

The RTF document contains an OLE object that leverages the Equation Editor vulnerability (CVE-2017-11882). The presence of `Ole10Native` stream and `objupdate` heuristic firings strongly indicate that this object is designed to be automatically activated upon opening the document. This technique is commonly used to download and execute a secondary payload, making it a critical part of the attack chain.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor Ole10Native payload — CVE-2017-11882 likely critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE
    RTF decodes to an activated Microsoft Equation 3.0 OLE storage whose payload is a high-entropy Ole10Native stream rather than normal Equation Native/MTEF data. This is a weaponized Equation Editor RCE delivery shape consistent with CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802.
  • Ole10Native stream in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_OLE10NATIVE_STREAM
    RTF contains an embedded OLE object with an Ole10Native stream. This is a strong payload-container signal and is related to Word/OLE exploit delivery, but it is not specific enough on its own to assign a CVE.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001bf6.bin
bb177e84c68564ed1b95e0c2f7a5cc665c2ad30d04e4f099bf3aec103ec056c4
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1BF6 4158 bytes