Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d7a94c0b1bfffdc5…

MALICIOUS

PDF

47.8 KB Created: 2020-10-24 20:51:57 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 2c912b1d6e023b5ea6ca300abd9bb5a9 SHA-1: 70314c654d46ca458fbba73e704c25e6ec629b0d SHA-256: d7a94c0b1bfffdc5e50d0695e434033508fd4d05004d7154f17a05dd017b1939
194 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a significant number of embedded links, many pointing to Weebly-hosted PDFs, suggesting a link farm or SEO abuse for traffic redirection. The heuristic 'SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE' indicates the document is designed to trick users into believing they need a password for an archive, a common tactic to hide malicious payloads. The presence of malicious redirector links further supports the malicious intent.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE
    Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ggtraff.ru/strik?keyword=n%25C3%25BAmero+total+de+coronas+duolingo
    • https://gujodoludota.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132681740/wedefupe.pdf
    • https://tivakoxidedopa.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130776298/808321d9.pdf
    • https://vekejuritikoj.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131857631/9293837.pdf
    • https://jawowigo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130774982/9083364.pdf
    • https://pojarepuvoweru.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/3/9/133999230/6f0f7.pdf
    • https://zavomafig.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134356936/busuzazofusa.pdf
    • https://jamafijuzu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437216/2632668.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/d0f46241-2aa7-44e0-b9eb-c51f566f2167/xaruw.pdf
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/505968bf-8427-45f1-8ca4-a33b48bfc02a/migirovuwipadazopupigopiv.pdf
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/aefe9766-3814-4b30-a6e3-ab1a1247fd4d/74981087185.pdf
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/3d00c22a-38ba-4701-9044-c8c83d25e127/lera_ugn_stra_indiska_restauranger.pdf
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/cb6b357a-c400-4f9a-8dcd-464e60aab2fc/xupimibidix.pdf
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/2939801e-3c86-4d10-8b13-910a4c8dbe10/22565436142.pdf
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/3ab19801-8cab-4ee5-80e3-880d60481714/xedoxepufe.pdf
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/6073358e-a2bb-4b2c-a78f-f7e98428e9d8/20617146783.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0268/8263/8017/files/camp_camp_nerris_fanfiction.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/4456/8220/files/zotikin.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0498/3232/9371/files/nubuze.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0481/7738/1543/files/48345928606.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0435/2406/3392/files/dudokikuka.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0486/8256/5782/files/nixonumojizorutasem.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/3219/0876/files/blank_nutrition_label.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0503/4295/3154/files/brain_parts_and_functions.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off000076cb.bin
903dad32b7527cf864587da1533cc85e6b8ed86e26b0adbf1d2f7ce270f63d1d		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x76CB 5344 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off000088a6.bin
179fc9579c91baadd4605e4a7974b715534fdc9aecc2b2e1ba5a13a804629564		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x88A6 12192 bytes

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