Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d78dcde348da064d…

MALICIOUS

RTF

787.5 KB Created: 2018-04-18 01:55:00 First seen: 2019-11-20
MD5: 80ab14c48dab10326e4a2248dd6a44cd SHA-1: 8199ebada0c24067f8c5fa685bf1f3354b9ccfb5 SHA-256: d78dcde348da064d2222b62e7efe5ed750862c3398573c8bc5823b5ae527392e
142 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains multiple embedded OLE objects and triggers an OLE activation via \objupdate, which is a strong indicator of exploitation. The critical heuristic firing for CVE-2017-8759 confirms the exploitation of this specific vulnerability to achieve code execution. The embedded benign URL is not considered a malicious IOC.

Heuristics 5

  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 10 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml In RTF body

Extracted artifacts 10

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00002c1b.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x2C1B 26683 bytes
SHA-256: 0b66b6c84dbcc4f68a145d032ea89467719e5b8a68c16cbe0676eb6f47deed40
objdata_01_off000156cd.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x156CD 26683 bytes
SHA-256: 4c470eba3428c188c1f4e725896abfeb537aeafc5c3f1460c3e08c95ba7a968e
objdata_02_off0002817f.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x2817F 26683 bytes
SHA-256: a68d38b02f6f1765490ba01bd6e274185070148b0302b8cfe3c9faa6d652a53e
objdata_03_off0003ac31.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x3AC31 26683 bytes
SHA-256: 7efde3e214672790d89e1f9d34f2217784d10682baffb98317f247f3d2ccf7e3
objdata_04_off0004d6e3.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x4D6E3 26683 bytes
SHA-256: 434023a312e656a492a4da9af5e7e5372df2f5f00f3eea32d5096f310343cda2
objdata_05_off000601e1.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x601E1 26683 bytes
SHA-256: ee74eb628a212ed57625099421f30ecd3dafe6ad84e21391590ffeb43b5de8da
objdata_06_off00072c93.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x72C93 26683 bytes
SHA-256: 7f7a115356302e3df032c54c96c05c05df0049d244145f4605f123dda3e421fb
objdata_07_off00085745.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x85745 26683 bytes
SHA-256: ff80bc84b28f85d1849281b4f85da6e11753c96bd23d8acadbfb11bcd5d8768f
objdata_08_off000981f7.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x981F7 26683 bytes
SHA-256: f73c43f6cd5440b57bc1acaf31ca0e51b96ab80b4e4826f25f9e542dd3ef2bb6
objdata_09_off000aaca9.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xAACA9 26683 bytes
SHA-256: 2be9e85e91778867d03f667cbc93ccc48a51ed377ee05b6b9f6f83290546dd1c