Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d783cb7a9e1b6984…

MALICIOUS

PDF

99.9 KB
MD5: 517b109ec351664e4a489d49d3c0d6de SHA-1: 79e2c74791938b709f32c648c81d7dd14c76a6ef SHA-256: d783cb7a9e1b6984199353133ccc50187d8ff5417f3e8e3ff33b1073d7067ea6
136 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File: Malicious PDF T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell

The PDF file exploits CVE-2010-0188, a known vulnerability in Adobe Reader related to LibTIFF XFA image processing. This exploit is designed to execute arbitrary code. The presence of XFA forms and embedded scripts further supports the exploitation of this vulnerability to deliver a malicious payload. No specific family could be identified, but the attack pattern is consistent with PDF-based exploit delivery.

Heuristics 6

  • Adobe Reader LibTIFF XFA image exploit — CVE-2010-0188 critical CVE likely CVE_2010_0188
    PDF contains the CVE-2010-0188 exploit template: XFA JavaScript heap-spray setup, a generated TIFF image payload, and assignment of that TIFF data to an XFA image field rawValue to trigger Adobe Reader's LibTIFF parser.
  • XFA form contains executable script high CVE related PDF_XFA_SCRIPT
    PDF embeds an XFA form whose dataset contains a <script> or <xfa:script> block — XFA scripting has been the exploit primitive for several Adobe Reader RCEs (CVE-2010-0188 family, CVE-2018-4901, and others). Plain XFA without scripts is far less risky.
  • Embedded script payload in PDF stream medium PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an HTML/XFA <script> tag without accompanying Windows shell-execution primitives — common in accessible XFA forms but worth surfacing for analyst review.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • XFA form low PDF_XFA
    PDF uses XML Forms Architecture — can contain script logic
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://ns.adobe.com/xdp/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-template/2.5/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-data/1.0/

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_file_obj0008.bin
664da06a1de9bf1286e4cb41c0336352d205be9c39d4eb617596a6141e859cef		 pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 8 at offset 0xC6 101522 bytes

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