Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d77511ed211a7b6f…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

1.12 MB Created: 2019-09-17 13:59:00
MD5: 081b5db19e4ba81c1afc4f2eadd2f24e SHA-1: 199da2180e73d8da90e278a988ceef767f6b471f SHA-256: d77511ed211a7b6fc15e3b859f6373f2eefb90c828bd1b202ccae1c961ccd831
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.001 PowerShell T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The critical heuristic firings for RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR and CVE_2017_8759 indicate exploitation of a known vulnerability in the Equation Editor component. The presence of OLE object data and the objupdate heuristic suggest that the embedded object is designed to be activated, likely to trigger the exploit. This pattern is commonly used to download and execute additional malicious content.

Heuristics 6

  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • Equation Editor CLSID critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0010a327.bin
872445ef22d8b2358c5eab406c23e41986c85f4d8b90426934c740ac978054ad
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x10A327 3732 bytes