Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d73d3c8c39d1ef6d…

MALICIOUS

RTF

107.3 KB Created: 2020-01-16 14:02:00 First seen: 2020-05-25
MD5: 9ea68021063d953ebfe0e734342d7d0a SHA-1: fffa1b55e4493241dcb7baad0626080ae5bc1fa2 SHA-256: d73d3c8c39d1ef6ddefde6bcccf09116720a2786d0e6800e718e76957e7061e9
202 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains embedded OLE objects and triggers critical heuristics for CVE-2017-11882 and CVE-2017-8759, indicating exploitation for client execution. The embedded URL suggests the download of a second-stage payload, likely an MSI installer, which is characteristic of a malicious attachment delivered via spearphishing.

Heuristics 6

  • CVE-2017-11882 — Equation Editor FONT record overflow critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882
    Equation Editor MTEF contains an overlong FONT typeface field, the vulnerable copy primitive for CVE-2017-11882. This is stronger evidence than the Equation Editor CLSID alone because it identifies the malformed record that drives code execution in EQNEDT32.EXE.
  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://cermiamakmur.com/ii/bin_87dc.msi In RTF body
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordmlIn RTF body

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000089bb.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x89BB 15672 bytes
SHA-256: f6bcccaeea554e27141dc8ce0e2b2c3414766e72580e8f92fa90d530be598c21

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