Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d7375407ee910a2c…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

32.5 KB
MD5: 536c4dfffe535a81205a96eb5708d91a SHA-1: 78036a01e9c0c97e21e1a676330f4df81219b421 SHA-256: d7375407ee910a2ca4a57187a486e2c0be7a1962071afc059d976622658e59ce
60 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1566.002 Spearphishing Link

The OOXML file is encrypted with a default password and contains an embedded OLE object, indicating it is likely an exploit carrier. The heuristics suggest this is a common method for delivering malicious payloads. Without a document body or scripts, the exact attack vector and payload are not discernible, leading to a moderate confidence score.

Heuristics 2

  • Default-encrypted OOXML exploit carrier layout high OOXML_ENCRYPTED_EXPLOIT_CARRIER_SHAPE
    Default-password encrypted OOXML package contains embedded OLE object parts and additional activation/decoy parts. This layout is common in malicious Excel exploit delivery and requires inspecting the decrypted package.
  • Office OOXML encrypted with default VelvetSweatshop password medium OFFICE_DEFAULT_PASSWORD_ENCRYPTED_OOXML
    OLE EncryptedPackage decrypts with Excel's built-in VelvetSweatshop password. Office opens this transparently, and malware uses it to hide OOXML exploit parts from scanners that only inspect the outer OLE container.