Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d732bc4f7bd2951c…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

104.1 KB Created: 2022-08-12 03:32:00 UTC Authoring application: 12.0000 First seen: 2022-08-19
MD5: ccf66fd0fc09ba0ea0d43d3e2f62f5fd SHA-1: 67f6fe50e23f69f7af59acbd0a4ee8ed0c97f606 SHA-256: d732bc4f7bd2951cedef03a3a3235cce4f33602c858e0c5caceeb98f5bf1a4bf
102 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File: User Execution T1059.005 PowerShell T1566.002 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment

The sample leverages an OOXML OLE2Link object, a known technique associated with CVE-2017-0199, to fetch content from the URL https://office-fonts.herokuapp.com/en-us. The document also contains a lure instructing the user to 'Enable Editing', indicating a social engineering tactic to bypass security measures. This combination suggests the document is designed to download and execute a malicious payload.

Heuristics 4

  • OOXML OLE2Link remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 related high CVE related CVE_2017_0199_RELATED
    Document contains an o:OLEObject Type=Link whose external oleObject relationship points to a remote URL. This is the OOXML OLE2Link activation shape associated with CVE-2017-0199 delivery, but the local file does not expose URL Moniker bytes or a weaponized extension/content type, so the exact CVE cannot be proven statically.
  • External OLE object relationship high OOXML_EXTERNAL_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an oleObject relationship whose target is an external HTTP(S) URL. Office resolves this through OLE/object update paths rather than as a normal user-clicked hyperlink.
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://office-fonts.herokuapp.com/en-us
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
emf_00.emf
9c741c32b4e7b2291fb5cbb795901b118e0b5dd28922da5288831533dd512168		 ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image1.emf 5184 bytes

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