Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d70f33c99cf73466…

MALICIOUS

PDF

77.1 KB Created: 2021-03-24 06:39:51 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-07-02
MD5: 6120208c023da9f9b41edebce2953599 SHA-1: 9d86cca00b5f76e4427b99ae684400209bb16563 SHA-256: d70f33c99cf734664c85ef4d3c6b084256d87782a93a2d1436e77ec1086f1cbc
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF document contains numerous external links, identified as a link farm, with one prominent URL pointing to a suspicious domain. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent, likely for phishing or to distribute further malware. Although no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and link farm suggest it's designed to redirect users to potentially harmful content.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9997

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://soxebez.ru/award?keyword=business+operations+manager+resume+pdf PDF link annotation
    • http://wigolexewaj.22web.org/risiligolagawotutisexo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zanijiwudiv.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135349447/davenigivarusa_xenonigove_waritosa_dixodezekozanij.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/vigesiji/jjLiagc/juxofukevivawagimexaz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://megogira.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134590171/662189.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kukixagunobi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135325453/5701162.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gakewejodum.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/9/134902465/dbec74d09b.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wirupexulabajes.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135322132/73272d8159.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/wotinobeb/hhifiai/starfleet_command_game_download.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/fipimomozuk/phjii6U/giribixaroziza.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://lawagupavuraxap.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134616311/ae921151f97.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xutevuper.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/9/130969179/45e7c68be55.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://1ae094b9-110d-4377-a83c-911b29edd90d.filesusr.com/ugd/d5eada_229cff08fe0248e6902b43fc55444384.pdf?index=trueIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/mawesenasijoser/xubiv.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://1ebfeea1-7d02-43b8-8f0a-002c87bc7f75.filesusr.com/ugd/50dcf6_fb7908195c45443b83ab83dab4b4d6ba.pdf?index=trueIn PDF document text
    • http://tufuripisaren.epizy.com/kewimimikulu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/gidibesuxi/vulugipikemuf.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://c301b42c-deab-4116-afcd-a09dd0728425.filesusr.com/ugd/4bb894_0a16ebc6c6494384b616781474004992.pdf?index=trueIn PDF document text
    • http://ketawod.epizy.com/5690793559.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://11484d69-1612-41b9-9199-165df1f08223.filesusr.com/ugd/e2f197_988b9a68161e47fab4d6be1f871a36a1.pdf?index=trueIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/xixonu/99322133044.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://vesunebujel.rf.gd/cisco_discovery_protocol.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000ecf2.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xECF2 5380 bytes
SHA-256: 912fb1ec33a74f6d89c894c3f2a4b1c1092e734c2ada6d26bd57ecd3ef3663da
font_01_sfnt_off0000ff2d.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xFF2D 11156 bytes
SHA-256: 22d6c600e251ba041e7562bfc3ff89e2797fb2b8c95908726412538a3d7b6010

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