Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d6fc29cfe50a1f4d…

MALICIOUS

PDF

77.9 KB Created: 2021-02-10 08:04:22 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-14
MD5: 8082f2253371a3083b76930c59c95d3f SHA-1: 7bfdfe48ca7814add7ea680823ec569c4f43fdf5 SHA-256: d6fc29cfe50a1f4de534c4c7361177a75a01f7af7d7cf0bad30e20a4835a77d1
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains multiple embedded links, with at least one pointing to known malicious redirector infrastructure. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent, likely phishing or malware distribution. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and embedded links suggest an attempt to redirect the user to a malicious site, potentially for credential harvesting or further payload delivery.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 5

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://yafferge.ru/123?utm_term=psalm+23+verse+5-6 In PDF document text
    • http://vilelares.iblogger.org/formato_cdate_vba_excel.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/munuluxel/idfibIO/children_s_nursery_rhymes_songs_uk.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/koroxofusino/jhghfEH/rekepibenajafawi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kabawerabava.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130774965/nolawuzepep-kaduwosij-tenuxeli.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/pudinivil/ibyhaMy/play_plants_vs_zombies_2_online_hacked.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fazinetogoxuv.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135383047/1522972.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/sixitigoxeto/l4gehgc/guess_the_liverpool_football_players_1970s.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/goganededem/qqgglhb/93270528260.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://rokamik.iblogger.org/ratedenujoxuxesaxizugut.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ramosek.iblogger.org/novaro_homunculus_leveling_guide.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/In PDF document text
    • http://juvadapirepaf.epizy.com/kudosasugeduxikimowoxif.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://vatamutotomo.epizy.com/pubetegubefamagixobisi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://bajokekez.epizy.com/good_golly_miss_molly_sheet_music.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://nukigusesirujop.epizy.com/rarumug.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://lumuwejonalar.epizy.com/blood_pressure_measurement_guidelines_2019.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://nuwikomoxiso.epizy.com/xafaze.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e654.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE654 4940 bytes
SHA-256: d7f2f8b64b063357d275e15044f2e5fbc1b434dfe8fa500aa692a1e204448212
font_01_sfnt_off0000f714.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF714 10944 bytes
SHA-256: 8eb1e291dd49250ff373ec87c2e5ebf56a661f342b5f9be11f5c769258ff62ec
font_02_sfnt_off00011c3d.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x11C3D 4324 bytes
SHA-256: b50a2106bf82917db0cd3cf88f63c5e8cc3298b343ace5cffc591b35df33d24c

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