Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d6ed4b9ed2939aa7…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

261.6 KB First seen: 2022-03-21
MD5: 651fceed6acc2043785bcd4e018da2fb SHA-1: 843e3392fcb8cee678bdcc5dcef468f53c8379d6 SHA-256: d6ed4b9ed2939aa7c562e3834ab52215333570ebb80357a0b4fc76ac2985b162
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1137.003 DLL Search Order Hijacking

The RTF document contains multiple OLE objects, with heuristics indicating that \objupdate forces OLE activation and a Composite Moniker is present. The document body explicitly instructs the user to 'click Enable Editing to view the document,' a clear lure to bypass macro security settings. This suggests the document is designed to drop and execute a malicious payload via the embedded OLE object.

Heuristics 5

  • Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED
    RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 3 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000ba2.bin
e188cd53272ab93f14ce3fe8d4949816ca44429cca935aba6588558d64952daf
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xBA2 36940 bytes
objdata_01_off00013862.bin
563f80f6a3784d63d2ba6fa5af1c1360f9ba5ed48a8a15d334699378e3f436cf
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x13862 2632 bytes
objdata_02_off00014e05.bin
44deae4627fee3c44f54d5bd10477ec2e17f4c08135f08e2417832e36d10d037
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x14E05 12297 bytes