Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d6df649542ff3f7e…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

16.5 KB Created: 2022-05-31 07:04:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 15.0000 First seen: 2022-08-17
MD5: 1166e448f3559fa05b80c344d4feda25 SHA-1: 636b537acfb5edcb2f96570f8349193376135336 SHA-256: d6df649542ff3f7e0ccfb63baf478721e86ae4298db7cf99a26baa8cb6ced51e
162 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1204.002 Malicious Link: Malicious File T1566 Phishing T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell

The sample leverages OOXML external OLE objects and is related to CVE-2017-0199 and CVE-2022-30190 (Follina). These vulnerabilities allow the document to fetch and execute a payload from the URL https://srvdftest1/payload.html. The embedded OLE object further indicates a malicious intent to deliver a secondary stage.

Heuristics 5

  • CVE-2022-30190 — Follina stage-1 external HTML oleObject critical CVE likely CVE_2022_30190
    External OLEObject relationship targets a remote .html with the Follina delivery shape (oleObject -> HTTP(S) HTML with trailing Moniker '!'). In live Follina samples the ms-msdt: trigger is served by the remote HTML, not the document itself.
  • OOXML OLE2Link remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 related high CVE related CVE_2017_0199_RELATED
    Document contains an o:OLEObject Type=Link whose external oleObject relationship points to a remote URL. This is the OOXML OLE2Link activation shape associated with CVE-2017-0199 delivery, but the local file does not expose URL Moniker bytes or a weaponized extension/content type, so the exact CVE cannot be proven statically.
  • External OLE object relationship high OOXML_EXTERNAL_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an oleObject relationship whose target is an external HTTP(S) URL. Office resolves this through OLE/object update paths rather than as a normal user-clicked hyperlink.
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://srvdftest1/payload.html
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://purl.oclc.org/ooxml/officeDocument/relationships
    • http://purl.oclc.org/ooxml/officeDocument/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://purl.oclc.org/ooxml/drawingml/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://purl.oclc.org/ooxml/wordprocessingml/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin
e5d10aaa8fc2b154e3e50652ce8212d688945730c4961410bf54d4b6f484c5f9		 ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin 111104 bytes
ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin
111e237711ea94d90ffe93122c1d9e9a8e1537f2c1850828265451580d66abb0		 ole-package OOXML word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin Ole10Native stream: Ole10Native 107428 bytes

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