Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d6abd45f79810924…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

432.5 KB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-03-08
MD5: bd630c5c849885af14ad07254d2b97ac SHA-1: 73f12abf504a943513e187919e5190025e90468c SHA-256: d6abd45f79810924042dcc996e75412aeef9e399693d1cd85f4e7ffc5813d474
70 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.005 Visual Basic

The sample is an Excel file that leverages the CVE-2017-0199 vulnerability. This vulnerability allows the file to act as a remote loader, fetching and executing a secondary payload from the embedded URL. The VBA project itself contains no executable statements, indicating the exploit relies solely on the OLE object's ability to fetch external content. The primary IOC is the malicious URL used for payload delivery.

Heuristics 3

  • OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199
    Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://yyyyyYYYYUUSUUUUUUU3243242UUU23U423U4UU2UWWWWW8W8W7W8WWWWWWW878W8W8WW78WWWW87W87W88WEEW787888W88W8W@167.114.163.232/91.................................doc

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes