Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d6a79cee6064c3f7…

MALICIOUS

PDF

41.7 KB Created: 2020-08-23 18:30:07 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: c61d433afc5e746cbfa007dce09743e9 SHA-1: 506dd39f8703a62e722355951783ed54d0c17c69 SHA-256: d6a79cee6064c3f77d3f04e71fce006cce0e8348e40e935e1be710b641a7613f
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious Link

The PDF contains a mass of external links, including one pointing to a known malicious redirector. The document body text, though heavily obfuscated, contains a URL that appears to be a lure for educational worksheets. The heuristic 'PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK' indicates the primary link leads to malicious infrastructure. The 'SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE' heuristic suggests the document may also attempt to trick the user into executing commands.

Heuristics 4

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE
    Document tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.com/pify?keyword=3d+shapes+and+2d+shapes+worksheets
    • http://files.northsidebandsnc.org/uploads/1/3/0/7/130740573/4698353.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/6830/9152/files/doing_economics_greenlaw.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/6011/7152/files/baadshaho_movie_hd_720p_filmywap.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/3593/5388/files/25745887136.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0436/6457/2569/files/alchemist_dota_2.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/6716/2276/files/zebalifixetoka.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/5771/7152/files/96485738222.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/1243/1776/files/betiguxipal.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/6222/2232/files/balloon_movie_tamilplay.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0437/3449/9493/files/biochemistry_textbook_for_medical_students.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/3414/0056/files/pogixebori.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/2359/7725/files/87763872509.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006365.bin
13bd24c5a409e0fc8d7aae1a20e9353cdefb5546c1d1f05e310fd819a5b0869a		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6365 5372 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off000075aa.bin
0b7dfa67b379cfb009a6e00856703a8194c94342395a0cf96582377162362bb1		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x75AA 10788 bytes

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