Malicious Office (OLE) / .PPT — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d671ad2cc8f4e606…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .PPT

225.0 KB Created: 2006-08-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office PowerPoint
MD5: fd407408f50ea21708da7169a2949a9f SHA-1: f505514b96ea7063777adb6d4582f601531c1ef1 SHA-256: d671ad2cc8f4e60658fe2c0df48edf3fe15cec8b85283dcf33ea53211d91e51e
220 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.002 Malicious File

The file contains VBA macros, with a critical heuristic firing for a Shell() call that is obfuscated using character-shift decoding (Mid/Asc/Chr). The Auto_Close macro is present, indicating execution upon closing the document. This suggests the macro is designed to download and execute a second-stage payload. The specific command executed by Shell() could not be fully reconstructed due to the obfuscation, but the presence of the Auto_Close macro and the Shell() call are high-priority indicators.

Heuristics 6

  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • VBA character-shift decoded Shell command critical OLE_VBA_ASC_CHR_SHIFT_SHELL
    VBA auto-exec macro stores an encoded command string, decodes it with a Mid/Asc/Chr character-shift loop, and passes the recovered text to Shell. This is a high-confidence command stager.
  • Auto_Close macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOCLOSE
    Auto_Close macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA macros detected medium OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://%8234%8234@j.mp/ddkslasdjalsjdasnw

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
e48a8d5d0de6e02919db7f4416f45a0de2d64a9ce031f279e95f65d40e18e530
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 47964 bytes