Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d664e711212b131f…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

15.9 KB
MD5: 9c1915e664f2019736a5cfd524569288 SHA-1: 6d1e5a562cc5a7640e51b3fe29250ee1dacc3a81 SHA-256: d664e711212b131f12baed69470bd6e6724a1f9e2a5ef5075a3e6876fe1c1ab1
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is an RTF document containing OLE object data and specifically triggers the RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR heuristic, indicating the use of a known vulnerability in the Equation Editor component. The RTF_OBJUPDATE heuristic further suggests that the embedded OLE object is designed to be activated automatically. This combination strongly points to an exploit delivery mechanism, likely intended to download and execute a secondary payload.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000cb7.bin
ab2653fd343cf288fde4367369481930e3e4b525de5f011ad6ff7b65a7066d54
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xCB7 1768 bytes