Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d649242a20271701…

MALICIOUS

PDF

41.3 KB Created: 2020-08-29 23:33:09 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 5f76575b2b666fe37dac2ad3a2f849c8 SHA-1: 0b871100833ada5a77b3c6f9e43559b58addcd61 SHA-256: d649242a20271701bc11b938fa1dc9e073764a534431ea3903c98ac501518f62
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF contains a large number of embedded links, many of which point to static.usrfiles.com, but one critical link directs to a known malicious redirector at ttraff.com. This suggests a link farm or SEO poisoning tactic designed to drive traffic to malicious infrastructure. The document body itself is heavily obfuscated and appears to contain the malicious URL and several benign-looking PDF links.

Heuristics 3

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.com/wix?keyword=tenki+no+ko+sub
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/ceb2e8_f44b322bcaf34d3199fc7e42ee16aef0.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_a905ced1868b4c9397f96f1750eac592.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/1e32c2_57d25919ea1b478990fb5bf256b23e98.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_8277214f1e5a43b481e37def9055c2ab.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_4a38b91aee22431499a9fc49b698dd39.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/79e0dc_4c301939815c426a97d6c0e5c03023df.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_50ac7c30521a474289515246b2c668c0.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_9e4d68cb59ec4e08b0337687bd48d99e.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/7453/5067/files/tommy_tattoo_nightmare.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/5027/0869/files/2437095551.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/7111/1330/files/gotuxizubumonejinan.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0440/4540/2277/files/16609256119.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0435/3500/7893/files/autentico_2_core_practice_answers_page_62.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_4d30eb72c1cd403f8d412663ef2052de.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_0d7f62b6f81141dda8cfe8bf027d8c86.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/8de238_1aecb8bf91b542dba7c471ae73001780.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_bc382d467c754a869cd3d621bcb08ec2.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000645e.bin
83968c149e8f03afb43ad58d4857ca18188e47c1a5144083a6af81f3519c9e48		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x645E 4492 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off000073b8.bin
c1181e1a93e997e860baf68025c225203739941d8a6f44ac1aa95d6f3ec5e0d7		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x73B8 10540 bytes

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