Malicious Office (OLE) / .PPT — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d63f1396af973f00…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .PPT

68.0 KB Created: 2020-06-22 22:56:34 Authoring application: Microsoft Office PowerPoint
MD5: 6549ea79bd9aaf568b2c136e272b3c89 SHA-1: ca1dbe9bbfc570689900cc50f9ee6818a585dfa5 SHA-256: d63f1396af973f00d97a126b4cef9f908439139385ef2331e578f28344a23f3c
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059.001 PowerShell

The sample is a PowerPoint file containing VBA macros. The Auto_Close macro is configured to execute a shell command, indicating it's designed to download and execute a second-stage payload. The presence of a Shell() call and VBA p-code auto-execution further supports this. While a URL was extracted, it was confirmed as benign, suggesting the malicious payload URL might be dynamically generated or obfuscated within the VBA code.

Heuristics 5

  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • Auto_Close macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOCLOSE
    Auto_Close macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA macros detected medium OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://%40%40%40%40%40%40@j.mp/gshatysaghsa

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
b54a2e30b15071fcb21e59ec47540d4cb36431b60bb5a777cd5f55f1af9f052e
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 554 bytes